JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL CRISIS AND
RISK COMMUNICATION RESEARCH
Volume 2, Issue 2 · 2019

Volume Editor

Brooke Fisher Liu
University of Maryland
Editorial Assistant

Samantha J. Stanley
University of Maryland
Editor-in-Chief

Timothy L. Sellnow
University of Central Florida
Associate Editors

Patric R. Spence
University of Central Florida
Audra Diers-Lawson
Leeds Beckett University
Design and Layout

Concord Editorial and Design

Published by the Nicholson School of Communication and
Media at the University of Central Florida in association with the
International Crisis and Risk Communication Conference

The Journal of International Crisis and Risk Communication Research (JICRCR) is a biannual
peer-reviewed, open access publication of the Nicholson School of Communication and
Media at the University of Central Florida and is an extension of the International Crisis and
Risk Communication Conference (ICRCC).
The Journal of International Crisis and Risk Communication Research (Print: ISSN 2576-0017)
is published once a year in print and biannually online in March and October (Online: ISSN
2576-0025). The print volume contains both issues from the calendar year. Institutional,
organizational, and individual subscribers are invited to subscribe to the print edition using
the following mailing address:
Journal of International Crisis and Risk Communication Research (JICRCR)
Nicholson School of Communication and Media
University of Central Florida
12405 Aquarius Agora Dr.
Orlando, FL 32816-1344, USA
Print subscription rates in the United States:
Individuals: 1 year (2 issues in one volume), $40
Libraries and organizations: 1 year (2 issues in one volume), $75
Checks should be made payable to the University of Central Florida. If subscribing outside of
the United States, please contact the Editor-in-Chief for the current rate.
Copyright © 2019 Journal of International Crisis and Risk Communication Research. All
rights reserved.
In consideration for publication of the article, the author(s) assign to JICRCR the copyright
to the article, subject to the expansive personal-use exceptions. All articles in JICRCR are
open access and after a six-month embargo the article may be distributed under personal-use
exceptions.
Reproduction, posting, transmission, or other distribution or use of the article or any
material therein, in any medium as permitted by a personal-use exemption, or by written
agreement of JICRCR, requires credit to JICRCR as copyright holder (e.g., © 2019 JICRCR).
After a six-month embargo or the publication of a new issue of JICRCR (which ever
happens first), author(s) and others are permitted to share, post, and redistribute articles
and do not require further permission from JICRCR, provided there are no alterations to the
format or content of the articles, including the copyright notification. Authors and others are
not granted permission to modify materials or use them for commercial purposes.
For a complete explanation of permissions and copyright, please visit: www.jicrcr.com.

J

R
I C R
C

J

R
I C R
C

JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL CRISIS AND
RISK COMMUNICATION RESEARCH
Volume 2, Issue 2 · 2019

Crisis Frame Dynamics: Frame Diversity in News Media
and the Role of Governmental Actors.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
Fynn Gerken and Toni G. L. A. van der Meer
Personal, Interpersonal, and Media Predictors of Fear of Ebola. . . . . . 181
James Price Dillard and Chun Yang
If Crisis or War Comes: A Study of Risk Communication
of Eight European Union Member States.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207
Evangelia Petridou, Erna Danielsson, Anna Olofsson,
Minna Lundgren, and Christine Große
A Multidimensional Analysis of Stigma: Findings From a
Qualitative Study of Fukushima Residents Following
Japan’s 2011 Nuclear Disaster. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233
Allison Kwesell and Joo-Young Jung
Social Media Posts of the Samsung Galaxy Note 7 Explosion:
A Comparative Analysis of Crisis Framing and Sentiment
in Three Nations.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 259
Seok Kang, KyuJin Shim, and Jiyoun Kim
What Do Reviewers Want? Reflections on Editing the
Journal for the Past Year. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 291
Brooke Fisher Liu and Samantha J. Stanley

JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL CRISIS AND
RISK COMMUNICATION RESEARCH
Editorial Board
Kathryn Anthony, University of Southern Mississippi
Lucinda Austin, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
William Benoit, University of Alabama at Birmingham
An-Sofie Claeys, KU Leuven
Julie Demuth, National Center for Atmospheric Research
Audra Diers-Lawson, Leeds Beckett University
Melissa Dodd, University of Central Florida
Elizabeth Avery Foster, University of Tennessee
Finn Frandsen, Aarhus University
Julia Fraustino, West Virginia University
Amiso George, Texas Christian University
Rebecca Hayes, Illinois State University
Robert Heath, University of Houston
J. Suzanne Horsley, University of Alabama
Joel Iverson, University of Montana
Yan Jin, University of Georgia
Winni Johansen, Aarhus University
Bengt Johansson, University of Gothenburg
Eyun-Jung Ki, University of Alabama
Sora Kim, Chinese University of Hong Kong
Kenneth Lachlan, University of Connecticut
Leesa Lin, Harvard University
Xialing Lin, Pennsylvania State University–Scranton
Robert Littlefield, University of Central Florida
Amisha Mehta, Queensland University of Technology
Glen Nowak, University of Georgia
H. Dan O’Hair, University of Kentucky
Henrik Olinder, Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB)
Hye-Jin Paek, Hanyang University
Tyler Page, Mississippi State University
Augustine Pang, Singapore Management University
Laura Pechta, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
Elizabeth Petrun Sayers, RAND

Kathy Rowan, George Mason University
Andreas Schwarz, Ilmenau University of Technology
Matthew Seeger, Wayne State University
Deanna Sellnow, University of Central Florida
Patric Spence, University of Central Florida
Toni van der Meer, University of Amsterdam
Steven Venette, University of Southern Mississippi
Orla Vigsö, University of Gothenburg
Sifan Xu, University of Tennessee

JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL CRISIS AND RISK
COMMUNICATION RESEARCH
2019, VOL. 2, NO 2, 149–180
https://doi.org/10.30658/jicrcr.2.2.1

Nicholson School of
Communication and Media
University of Central Florida
www.jicrcr.com

Crisis Frame Dynamics: Frame Diversity
in News Media and the Role of
Governmental Actors
Fynn Gerkena and Toni G. L. A. van der Meerb
a
Department of Accounting and Finance, University of Antwerp, Antwerp,
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ABSTRACT
This study aims to understand the dynamic evolvement of frames in news media coverage of
the Ebola crisis (2014–2015) and their interplay with narratives put forth in press releases from
governmental organizations (GOs). An automated content analysis was applied to U.S. newspapers
and GOs’ press releases on the Ebola epidemic. Time series analyses illustrate how the scope of
frames in news media becomes narrower (decreased diversity) with the presence of immediate
and problem-focused crisis frames and wider (increased diversity) with more progressive frames.
Additionally, the results imply that a level of shared interpretation (frame alignment) between
media and GOs fosters the openness of news media for a variety of frames, which in turn might
lead to a communicative shift that eases the crisis atmosphere.
KEYWORDS: Crisis communication; framing; news frame diversity; frame alignment;
automated content analysis

On March 23, 2014, the World Health Organization (WHO, 2015) reported on the first cases of Ebola in West Africa. The emergence and
spread of such infectious diseases are characterized by a complex of
social, technological, and environmental dynamics that give rise to
multiple narratives (Leach, Scoones, & Stirling, 2010). Involved actors
(e.g., news media and governmental organizations [GOs]) socially
co-construct and develop the meaning of these events in their communication (e.g., Schultz & Raupp, 2010). Their framing of public health
crises suggests and promotes certain strategies and interventions that
ultimately influence outbreak responses (Leach et al., 2010). This study
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aims to understand the dynamic evolvement of frames in news media
coverage of the Ebola crisis (2014–2015) and their communicative interplay with narratives put forth in GOs’ press releases.
During crises, news media serve as the primary channel for crisis
communication (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2014;
Glik, 2007) and make crucial information available (Sorribes & Rovira,
2011). In their role as a central realm for negotiating crisis understanding, news media are considered to play a leading role in the construction and evolvement of a crisis (Kleinnijenhuis, Schultz, & Oegema,
2015; Van der Meer, 2016b). They selectively emphasize a specific series
of unfolding events and offer interpretations to the public of how to
make sense of the situation at play (Van Gorp, 2007). At the same
time, GOs, as public service organizations, have the social function
to notify other actors about crisis developments and are an important
source of information (Liu & Horsley, 2007). During such uncertain
times, these organizations also need to come to an understanding of the
quickly unfolding events, which they then react to and communicate
about, thereby contributing to the construction of the crisis (Schultz
& Raupp, 2010).
Framing theory offers a powerful body of literature to study overtime patterns of narratives during crisis episodes (Geiß, Weber, & Quiring, 2016; Kleinnijenhuis et al., 2015; Snow, Vliegenthart, & CorrigallBrown, 2007) and is a useful theoretical lens to understand health crises
such as viral epidemics (e.g., Dudo, Dahlstrom, & Brossard, 2007; Lee
& Basnyat, 2013; Luther & Zhou, 2005). Prior research has suggested
that the concept of news frame diversity can provide important insights
into the dynamic crisis coverage by news media (e.g., Geiß et al., 2016),
and the concept of frame alignment allows the study of the interplay of
news media frames with frames promoted by GOs (e.g., Van der Meer,
Verhoeven, Beentjes, & Vliegenthart, 2014). Hence analyzing the overtime development of news frame diversity and frame alignment promises
novel insights into the complex crisis frame dynamics in news media
and the communicative role of GOs. First, through the concept of news
frame diversity, the variety of ways in which an event is framed in news
media can be studied (Geiß et al., 2016; Huang, 2010). Previous studies
have demonstrated that news media have a limited carrying capacity
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(Zhu, 1992; Zhu & McCombs, 1995) and that specific interpretations
of important events are able to temporarily displace other alternative
views around the issue (Geiß et al., 2016). During epidemic outbreaks,
these dominant interpretations can obscure alternative narratives that
put forth, for example, different causes or solutions to the crisis (Leach
et al., 2010). Therewith, a drop in diversity (i.e., the predominance of a
few major problems or a single issue or interpretation) might have real
consequences for the range of crisis responses that are implemented.
Investigating what types of interpretations can cause the news media
to narrow (or widen) their scope of frames can help understand what
drives the uniformity (or plurality) of presented viewpoints in news
media coverage during crises.
Second, the concept of frame alignment is useful to explore the communicative interplay between actors, such as news media and GOs,
by means of frame comparison (Snow, Rochford, Worden, & Benford,
1986). The alignment of frames can be considered to indicate an increase in mutual understanding of a crisis that helps to ease the crisis
atmosphere (e.g., Van der Meer et al., 2014). Hence, in crisis situations,
it might be especially important how actors collectively define, understand, and frame the crisis (Schultz & Raupp, 2010; Weick, 1988). To
date, however, research has not investigated how the framing of public
health crises in the news media relates to news media’s communicative
interaction with GOs. It remains unclear whether a degree of openness
for alternative views on a particular issue in news media (news frame
diversity) results in shared interpretations across actors (frame alignment) or if a level of shared interpretations motivates news media to
open up for varying views. Thus more advanced over-time analyses
are needed to understand the causal link between news frame diversity
and frame alignment.
To shed light on the dynamic evolvement of frames in news media
coverage of crises and their interplay with narratives put forth in press
releases from GOs, the following research question is addressed: How
does the frame diversity in news media coverage in times of crisis relate
to the presence of individual news frames and alignment with frames
offered by GOs? To answer the question, this study relies on automated
content analysis of a long-standing crisis (the Ebola crisis), studying
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the framing dynamics between U.S. news media and GOs throughout
54 weeks of the crisis.
Theoretical Framework
Framing

Framing theory offers a useful theoretical lens to investigate the dynamic process of meaning construction and negotiation (Gamson &
Modigliani, 1989). In current research, Entman’s (1993) definition of
framing has established itself as a common reference:
To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them
more salient in the communicating text, in such a way as to promote
a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation and/or treatment recommendation for the item described. (p. 52)

The idea of selection and salience implies that framing can increase attention to specific aspects of an issue and minimize attention to others
(Cappella & Jamieson, 1997). By bringing certain aspects to attention
(De Vreese, 2005), frames help individuals to organize a series of events,
ascribe meaning to them, and guide action (Benford & Snow, 2000).
A substantial number of studies have utilized framing to study
health-related issues, such as obesity (e.g., Hawkins & Linvill, 2010),
breast cancer (e.g., Andsager & Powers, 1999), and tobacco control
(e.g., Niederdeppe, Farrelly, Thomas, Wenter, & Weitzenkamp, 2007).
Yet, framing in severe health crises is much more dynamic given the
dramatic nature of the events (Lee & Basnyat, 2013). Therefore a subset
of research has focused more directly on frames in news coverage of
infectious diseases (e.g., Dudo et al., 2007; Luther & Zhou, 2005; Shih,
Wijaya, & Brossard, 2008; Tian & Stewart, 2005) and compared these
to frames in GOs’ press releases (e.g., Lee & Basnyat, 2013; Rossmann,
Meyer, & Schulz, 2018). Combined, the predominance of framing theory
in studies of news media coverage and effects in the health literature
demonstrates the value of this theoretical lens for examining news
media coverage during the Ebola crisis. However, the majority of these
studies have applied a deductive approach to classify frames (i.e., relied
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on predefined frames) with few exceptions (e.g., Tian & Stewart, 2005).
In contrast to this body of research, the present study identifies frames
inductively, which results in more issue-specific frames that are directly
related to the Ebola crisis.
News media’s crisis framing. In general, news media are an important source for health information (Andsager & Powers, 1999; Viswanath
& Emmons, 2006), and even more so during crisis and risk situations
(Thomas, Friedman, Brandt, Spencer, & Tanner, 2016). News media can
shape public opinion by calling attention to certain issues (McCombs
& Shaw, 1972), offering interpretations of events (Van Gorp, 2007),
and advising protective action (Liu, Fraustino, & Jin, 2015). Often, the
public’s meaning construction and actions are based on information
provided by news media (Sorribes & Rovira, 2011). News media make
sense of incidences and organize them into a meaningful succession,
thereby influencing the construction of reality (Hallahan, 1999).
The influence of media frames on the public might be particularly
pronounced during epidemics because the public has no direct experience with the pressing topic (Ball-Rokeach & de Fleur, 1976; Shih et
al., 2008). Depending on the salience of an epidemic on the media’s
agenda, coverage can heighten or reduce the public’s risk perception
(Dudo et al., 2007; Kilgo, Yoo, & Johnson, 2018). Applying Iyengar’s
(1991) classification of generic frames into episodic (i.e., single, specific
event-driven cases) and thematic frames (i.e., placing events into an
overriding issue), Dudo et al. (2007) found that U.S. news coverage of
the avian flu was dominantly episodic. Because episodic frames present
specific event-focused cases and focus on emotions and sensationalism
(De Vreese, Peter, & Semetko, 2001), this kind of frame might hinder
informed judgment about risks associated with the crisis (Dudo et al.,
2007). Thus news media, in their coverage and framing, can spark or
prevent crisis escalation and ultimately impact the crisis evolvement
(Schultz, Kleinnijenhuis, Oegema, Utz, & van Atteveldt, 2012).
GOs’ crisis framing. GOs are another key actor in times of crisis. As
public organizations, they are a key holder of information and have the
social function to communicate quickly as an objective and trustworthy
source to protect the public (Liu & Horsley, 2007). Press releases serve
as a vehicle for health organizations to inform the public through the
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media (Rossmann et al., 2018). Their communication aims to notify the
public about the actions the public should take, for example, to avoid
physical harm (Coombs, 2007). Furthermore, to reduce psychological
stress among the public, GOs are expected to disclose actions that are
implemented to solve the problem and prevent similar occurrences in
the future (e.g., Kim & Liu, 2012).
Crisis framing across actors. Frames assist actors to communicate
via various platforms and come to a (shared) understanding of a crisis
(Schultz & Raupp, 2010; Weick, 1988) and ultimately decrease uncertainty (Leydesdorff & Ivanova, 2014). These frames can differ between
actors per crisis phase (Van der Meer et al., 2014) because crisis actors
provide competing interpretations (Seeger, 2002). While news media
frequently use frames offered by sources such as GOs, they might also
adapt these frames (Lee & Basnyat, 2013; Vasterman & Ruigrok, 2013).
Hence frames are the result of communicative negotiation processes
over meaning between the media and their sources (Vliegenthart & van
Zoonen, 2011). Studying frames of news media and GOs thus promises
useful insight into how central actors made sense of the Ebola crisis and
how meaning construction evolved as the epidemic unfolded.
Yet, research into framing across news media and GOs has been
limited, with few exceptions (e.g., Lee & Basnyat, 2013; Rossmann et al.,
2018; Vasterman & Ruigrok, 2013). Rossmann et al. (2018) found that
European news coverage during the H1N1 epidemic more frequently
emphasized risks, while press releases by GOs framed the crisis more
dominantly in risk-attenuating terms. In contrast, Vasterman and
Ruigrok (2013) found that while Dutch news media coverage during
the H1N1 crisis frequently featured alarming frames, the coverage was
not more alarming than its news sources. In addition, Lee and Basnyat
(2013) traced press release of GOs in Singapore to news stories of the
H1N1 crisis, showing that journalists very selectively use provided
information and change the frames they use in coverage.
To reach a closer understanding of how news media covered the
Ebola crisis and how GOs communicated about the epidemic, it is important to analyze the frames that both actors constructed. Therefore
the first research question asks the following:
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RQ1: What frames are constructed by news media and GOs during
the Ebola crisis?

News Frame Diversity

Research into communicative diversity in terms of actors, issues, and
frames in communication has its origins in agenda-setting research
(e.g., Jennings, Bevan, & John, 2011; Zhu, 1992). The concept of news
frame diversity focuses on the heterogeneity of news media framing
and can be conceptualized as the semantic variety of frames present
in a text (Huang, 2010). Variety of frame presence in news media coverage can be considered along a continuum from the dominance of a
single frame (i.e., low news frame diversity) to complete heterogeneity
of frames (i.e., high news frame diversity; Entman, 2003). Because the
framing environment is contested with differently strong frames competing in news coverage for dominance (Chong & Druckman, 2007),
news frame diversity closely relates to the idea of a zero-sum dynamic
in news media, where a rise in salience of one aspect or interpretation
of a subject comes at the cost of the salience of another (Zhu, 1992; Zhu
& McCombs, 1995).
Previous research has indicated that news frame diversity can provide important insights into the dynamic crisis coverage by news media
(e.g., Geiß et al., 2016) and that the limited presence of alternative information can have consequences for crisis development (e.g., Kleinnijenhuis et al., 2015; Suedfeld & Tetlock, 1977) and solutions (Leach
et al., 2010). When major events take place, minor items are pushed
from the news media agenda by breaking news (Berkowitz, 1992). For
instance, news broadcasts may devote the majority of their time to a
segment about the Ebola outbreak. The audience can infer from this
predominance of a single issue that a new crisis occurred (Kleinnijenhuis et al., 2015). In a similar vein, dramatic events during crises, such
as the diagnosis of Ebola on U.S. soil, can lead to a temporary rise of
only a few frames focusing on key elements of the issue (Scheufele,
2006). The resulting drop in diversity (i.e., the predominance of a single
issue or interpretation) thus suggests a focus on a few major problems
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(rather than a variety of minor issues), which signals an increase in
crisis intensity (Kleinnijenhuis et al., 2015).
More fundamentally, the narrow focus on problems can have real
consequences for crisis outcomes. Often, policy decisions and interventions during epidemics are based on a narrow subset of potential courses
of actions because actors and institutions “close down” around a limited
number of narratives (Stirling, 2008). However, as long as a narrow
focus on a few interpretations persists, “a trade-off with the issues of
other stakeholders is more unlikely” (Kleinnijenhuis et al., 2015, p. 4)
and thus alternative solutions remain absent. Particularly, health crises
such as Ebola may require a greater openness to alternative narratives
that “highlight issues, understandings and forms of knowledge which
are vital to ensure that outbreak responses are attuned to local ecological and social circumstances, and so actually work” (Leach et al., 2010,
p. 375). Therefore, to respond appropriately to epidemics, it might be
detrimental for news media to fail to move beyond a singular narrative
and embrace alternative viewpoints (Leach et al., 2010; Stirling, 2008).
Despite this evidence, little research has investigated what communication patterns result in a drop or rise in news frame diversity.
Research by Geiß et al. (2016) provided evidence about the successfulness of frames that were promoted by influential actors to temporarily
displace alternative frames around important events. Focusing on the
health context, the present study investigates what interpretations cause
news media to narrow or widen their scope of frames during crises.
The second research question, therefore, asks the following:
RQ2: What type of crisis frames are associated with a rise or drop in
frame diversity in news media coverage?

Frame Alignment

Besides the variety of frames in news media, the similarity of frames
between actors can offer further understanding of the communicative crisis process. During crises, actors desire to resolve differences
and come to a collective understanding of ambiguous and confusing
events (Snow et al., 1986; Van der Meer et al., 2014). After individual
meaning production, actors engage in collective sense making, which
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is likely to result in a temporal construction of similar frames (Van der
Meer et al., 2014). This similarity in frame construction can be understood as frame alignment. Therefore, in this article, frame alignment
is conceptualized as the similarity in presence of comparable frames
in actors’ communication about a certain event. Previous studies have
already provided qualitative (Snow et al., 1986) and quantitative (Van
der Meer et al., 2014) evidence for different degrees of frame alignment
throughout crises.
The level of alignment can also have substantial consequences for
crisis development. As long as confusion and incoherence are the
prevailing states of crisis, a solution to the crisis is improbable (Weick,
1988). Before a crisis can be solved, actors need to reach a degree of
consensus about what happened and what the complex events mean
(Van der Meer et al., 2014). As interpretations of events become more
similar, resulting in frame alignment, actors can reach a shared understanding (Snow et al., 1986) to avoid further escalation (Weick, 1988),
creating a precondition for crisis resolution.
Frame Alignment and News Frame Diversity

Prior literature indicates that both shared interpretations between
actors (frame alignment; Snow et al., 1986; Van der Meer et al., 2014;
Weick, 1988) and a diverse set of presented viewpoints in news media
(high news frame diversity; e.g., Huang, 2010; Kleinnijenhuis et al.,
2015; Wong, Ormiston, & Tetlock, 2011) are important preconditions
for relaxing the crisis atmosphere. However, it remains unclear whether
a plurality of perspectives in news media (high news frame diversity)
results in shared interpretations across actors (frame alignment) or if
a level of shared interpretations motivates news media to open up for
varying views.
On one hand, it is plausible that the media debate first needs to
open up to a broader set of perspectives (frame diversity) before they
can reach a level of shared interpretation of events with GOs (frame
alignment). As the crisis develops, news media coverage might move
away from the few dramatic interpretations of the events and turn
toward a greater variety of explanations. With the increasing diversity, an increase in perspectives is stimulated and openness for new
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information motivated (Wong et al., 2011). The necessary “space” in
the news media debate might be created for GOs’ frames to become
salient. The openness, in turn, might motivate actors to interact (Kleinnijenhuis et al., 2015), which might stimulate a shared understanding of
what the events signify and result in a rapprochement of actors’ frames
(Van der Meer et al., 2014).
On the other hand, shared interpretation among GOs and news
media (frame alignment) might be a precondition for media to move
away from homogeneous framing and a crisis atmosphere to open up
for multiple interpretations and viewpoints (frame diversity). Frame
alignment with GOs might have a calming impact on the news media
coverage and scope of frames, thereby increasing frame diversity. In
the midst of a crisis, media are often focused on the dramatic nature
of the events (Reintjes et al., 2016) and thus might initially neglect the
information and interpretations offered by the GOs. However, once
news media open up to these interpretations and reach a level of mutual
understanding, there may be a calming impact on news media coverage, allowing a shift of attention to alternative interpretations. Thus,
with the widening of opinions away from the narrow set of problems,
possible solutions can be discussed and the crisis atmosphere eases
(Kleinnijenhuis et al., 2015). To disentangle this complex communicative process, the third research question is formulated as follows:
RQ3: How does frame diversity in news media in times of crisis relate

to the alignment with frames offered by the GOs?
Method
Data Collection

To answer the research questions, an automated content analysis of
U.S. newspaper coverage and GOs’ press releases was conducted. The
Ebola crisis was selected as a case because the epidemic provides a
unique opportunity to study the dynamic crisis coverage of news media
and examine how news reporting affects (or is affected by) interaction
with GOs. The crisis began in March 2014 when the first cases were
reported in Guinea (WHO, 2015). While the majority of cases were
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reported in West Africa, attention in the United States was especially
high when four people were diagnosed with the virus in the United
States in September and October 2014. Given the significance and the
scale of the outbreak, the crisis offers an interesting context to answer
this study’s research questions.
Newspaper articles and press releases were collected between June 29,
2014, when attention started to increase in U.S. news media, and July 5,
2015, when attention faded away, indicated by a decreasing number
of articles about the epidemic. Five U.S. newspapers with complete
articles on LexisNexis were selected (the New York Times, Washington
Post, USA Today, Daily News [New York], and New York Post). Relevant
articles were selected by applying a search string containing the words
“Ebola,” “EVD” (for Ebola virus disease), or “EHD” (for Ebola hemorrhagic disease). This resulted in a total sample of 1,079 newspaper
articles. In total, four GOs were selected (the United Nations, WHO,
World Bank, and Centers for Disease Control and Prevention). Their
websites were searched for press releases about the outbreak, resulting
in a total sample of 324 press releases.
Operationalization
Frames. This study applies an inductive method to automatically

identify frames in actors’ crisis communication. More specifically, a
semantic network analysis was conducted, identifying latent patterns
in text based on word (co-)occurrences (Hellsten, Dawson, & Leydesdorff, 2010). This automated approach draws on the idea that a text
can be seen as a network of words that conveys their meaning, with
each network serving as an indicator for the frame they represent. By
clustering groups of correlating words, a higher order structure in text
and between text can be identified and frames detected (Hellsten et al.,
2010). In other words, analyzing the (co-)occurrence of words allows
one to quantify meaning in measurable units of analysis, thereby avoiding subjective bias. Research has already successfully applied this method, for instance, to compare discourses (Leydesdorff, 2005) or to explore
crisis frames (Gerken, Van der Land, & Van der Meer, 2016; Van der
Meer, 2014; Van der Meer et al., 2014). Thus frames in this research
will be operationalized as (co-)occurrences in communication, which
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generate latent semantic networks that convey their meaning (adapted
from Hellsten et al., 2010).
The main premise of such automated approaches is that documents
can be considered as a bag of words where a set of words is sufficient to
understand the meaning of a text (e.g., Grimmer & Stewart, 2013). This
idea is in line with the underlying theoretical assumptions of framing
theory that “text contains frames, which are manifested by the presence
or absence of certain keywords, stock phrases, stereotyped images,
sources of information, and sentences” (Entman, 1993, p. 52; for a more
detailed description of why frames can be analyzed in this way, see
Grimmer & Stewart, 2013; Hellsten et al., 2010; Van der Meer, 2016a).
The automated approach requires several practical steps (Vlieger
& Leydesdorff, 2011). In this study, frames were identified in all actors’
documents combined. First, a frequency list containing the 255 most
frequently used words was created. Common/meaningless words, organizational names, and search strings were removed with a stop-word
list, and words were reduced to their base forms. Second, after a manual
revision, a document–term occurrence matrix was conducted. Third,
the matrix was used to conduct principal component factor analysis.
To maximize the variable loadings on each factor, Varimax rotation
was selected. The retrieved components represent the frames. Through
an iterative process, 11 meaningful frames were inductively identified.
Finally, labels were assigned to the frames according to the words that
are part of the word clusters that make up the frame.
Frame diversity. Research into communicative diversity (e.g., agenda diversity and frame diversity) relates to the idea that a difference
in presence can be observed for a defined number of categories (e.g.,
Kleinnijenhuis et al., 2015). In this study, frame presence was measured
in the frequency of occurrence of each frame, in terms of articles that
contained a particular frame.
To analyze the frequency of occurrence in U.S. news media, AmCat
(the Amsterdam Content Analysis Toolkit; cf. van Atteveldt, 2008) was
utilized. First, for each frame, a search string was created, combining the
words that are part of the word clusters (or frame) in Apache Lucene
query language with Boolean operators (AND, OR) and wildcards (*, ?).
Words with factor loadings above .50 were combined with the operator
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AND, and words relating to the same concept (e.g., traveler, passenger)
combined with OR. The search queries were developed, tested, and
improved using samples from the population to ensure the validity
of the search strings. Second, all news documents were searched for
the presence of these frames in AmCat. The tool kit construed a data
matrix with rows representing the time (weekly level) and columns
representing frame presence, indicating the variety of frames present in
a given week. Third, to calculate frame presence and their prominence
in relation to one another, the Shannon and Weaver (1949) entropy
measure was used. This is a widely used measure for agenda and frame
diversity (e.g., Huang, 2010; Jennings et al., 2011; Kleinnijenhuis et al.,
2015; Zhu & McCombs, 1995).
Frame alignment. The concept of frame alignment relates to the
idea that different actors construct and use frames that differ in their
level of similarity at certain points in time (Van der Meer et al., 2014).
This study sets out to measure this similarity in framing by comparing
frame presence across actors over time. In other words, by measuring
the occurrence of a discrete number of frames for each actor in each
defined time period, the presence of frames can be compared across
actors.
This analysis is divided into several steps. First, the search strings
that were described in the previous section were used to construe a
data matrix in AmCat for each actor, with rows representing the time
and columns indicating the frame presence. Second, a new data set was
created from these matrices, where the cases represent the frames and a
variable each actor for every week. The cases could take values of zero
or any positive integer, with greater numbers representing a greater
frame presence. Third, the extent to which a frame was present in the
communication of both actors was tested by means of Pearson’s r correlations tests, week by week. The correlation scores provided insight
into the level of alignment over time.
Analysis
Partial adjustment autoregressive distribution lag (ADL) model.

To test the influence of frames on frame diversity in news media
(RQ2), a partial adjusted ADL (Koyck) model was estimated (data were
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aggregated on a weekly level) with frame diversity as the dependent
variable and news frames and attention as independent variables. Augmented Dickey–Fuller test for unit root (stationarity) was conducted,
and the series was tested for absence of autocorrelation in residuals
(i.e., white noise).
Vector autoregression (VAR). Following previous research (e.g.,
Kleinnijenhuis et al., 2015), a VAR model was estimated to test the causal
RQ3. The analysis tests for bidirectional causality in time series data
(aggregated on a weekly level) and consists of a series of ordinary least
squares regressions in which each variable is treated as both dependent
and independent variable (Vliegenthart, 2014). The model is based on
Granger causality, where external causes should only be assumed when
the own autoregressive past is not sufficient to explain a current value
(Brandt & Williams, 2007). In this model estimation, each value is regressed on its past value and the past value of the endogenous variable
as well as the cross-lagged influence of other variables. The variable x is
assumed to Granger-cause variable y if the prediction of y based on its
previous values is improved by including the previous values of x into
the equation (Brandt & Williams, 2007). Thus this analysis does not
test for actual causation but whether the time series of x has predictive
information about the time series of y.
News frame diversity and frame alignment served as endogenous
variables, with news attention (i.e., number of news articles) as an
exogenous variable to control for. The logarithm of the variable news
frame diversity was entered into the model to account for nonnormal
distributions. Dickey–Fuller tests were conducted to test for stationarity.
The maximum number of lags was limited to three, with the assumption
that a direct impact would only occur within 3 weeks or less (Vliegenthart, 2014). The final lag length included in the model was determined
by the Akaike information criterion (e.g., Vliegenthart, 2014). Tests for
the absence of autocorrelation (in residuals) were conducted.

family, sick, Liberia

protect, training, worker

Texas, Duncan, hospital

Leone, border, capital

disease, spread, infected

Spencer, Bellevue, quarantine

Obama, president, house

screening, airport, temperature

vaccine, trial, research

economic, million, impact

Victim, R2 = 4.95

Protection, R = 2.92

Intensification, R2 = 2.39

Outbreak, R2 = 2.14

Contagion, R = 1.84

Local infections, R2 = 1.62

Politics, R2 = 1.55

Prevention, R2 = 1.4

Research, R2 = 1.32

Consequences, R = 1.31

15 (1.39%)

39 (3.61%)

21 (1.95%)

89 (8.25%)

38 (3.52%)

430 (39.85%)

164 (15.2%)

175 (16.22%)

136 (12.6%)

58 (5.38%)

71 (6.58%)

News

57 (17.59%)

4 (1.23%)

1 (0.31%)

2 (0.62%)

0 (0%)

101 (31.17%)

35 (10.8%)

0 (0%)

12 (3.7%)

2 (0.62%)

165 (50.93%)

GOs

Occurrence a

72 (5.13%)

43 (3.06%)

22 (1.57%)

91 (6.49%)

38 (2.71%)

531 (37.85%)

199 (14.18%)

175 (12.47%)

148 (10.55%)

60 (4.28%)

236 (16.82%)

Total

a

Cells contain the number of documents with identified frames. Percentages in parentheses are calculated based on frame presence relative to overall
number of identified documents per actor to enable comparison.

Note. GO = governmental organization.

2

2

support, countries, community

Support, R2 = 8.39

2

Example indicators

Identified Frames in News Media and GOs’ Communication

Frame

TABLE 1
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Results
Frames in Communication (RQ1)

A semantic network analysis was conducted that investigated the frames
that were constructed by both actors. In total, 11 frames were identified and labeled, and their presence in communication was analyzed
to answer RQ1. Table 1 displays the frame presence in communication
from news media and GOs. In terms of frame presence, the results
reveal that news media dominantly focused on the spreading virus
and its related risks (contagion frame: 39.85%). To put it differently, the
contagion frame is present in 39.85% of the newspaper articles sampled.
In addition, frames about the pandemic outbreak in Africa (outbreak
frame: 15.2%), the first U.S. case that intensified the crisis (intensification frame: 16.22%), and the measures that need to be taken to protect
patients and health personnel (protection frame: 12.6%) were high on
the news media agenda. In contrast, GOs heavily emphasized the need
for international support (support frame: 50.93%).
Moreover, GOs strongly focused on the development of the virus
and its risk (contagion frame: 31.17%), the economic consequences of
the crisis (consequence frame: 17.59%), and the pandemic outbreak
center in Africa (outbreak frame: 10.8%). In sum, it becomes evident
that while some frames are only (or more strongly) emphasized by the
individual actors, others were high on both agendas (e.g., outbreak
frame, contagion frame).
Frames and News Frame Diversity: Partial Adjusted ADL
Model (RQ2)

To provide insight into framing dynamics during a crisis, the association between the specific news frames and news frame diversity was
analyzed, answering RQ2. The partial adjusted ADL model is presented
in Table 2 with news frame diversity serving as the dependent variable and a fraction of its past value and the identified news frames as
independent variables. In addition, news attention is incorporated as
a control variable in this analysis.
The reported coefficient of the autoregressive term (L. news frame
diversity) indicates that news frame diversity was not an autoregressive
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TABLE 2 Partial Adjustment Autoregressive Distribution Lag Model Predicting News
Frame Diversity Based on Identified Frames

News frame diversity
L. news frame diversity

0.05 (0.141)

News frame
Support

0.51 (0.07)**

Victim

0.60 (0.08)**

Protection

0.37 (0.06)

Intensification

−1.26 (0.40)*

Outbreak

−0.28 (0.04)

Contagion

−1.63 (0.04)**

Local infections

−0.29 (0.05)

Politics

0.59 (0.07)

Prevention

0.10 (0.06)

Research

0.16 (0.12)

Consequences

0.11 (0.17)

News attention

1.70 (0.02)*

R2

0.58

Note. Cells contain standardized (β) regression coefficients with standard errors (SE). The
independent trend variable and constant are absent from this table.
*p < 0.10. **p < .05.

process (β = 0.05, p = .72), meaning that past values are not predictive
of future values. Thus it seems that the development of frame diversity
in news media over time was dynamic and random, corresponding
to a degree of instability in the crisis development. In addition, the
results provide evidence that the rise of certain frames can decrease
the variety of frames present in news media coverage. More specifically, an increase in presence of the contagion frame in news media
was associated with a significant decrease in news frame diversity
(β = −1.63, p < .01). This suggests that when frames with words emphasizing the contagious nature of the virus, such as disease, spread, and
infected, were increasingly present in the coverage, other frames were
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pushed from the media agenda. Similarly, a rise of the intensification
frame in news media was associated with a decrease in frame diversity
(β = −1.26, p < .10).
An opposite effect, however, is evident for other frames. The results reveal that greater presence of the support frame was associated
with a significant increase in frame diversity in news media coverage
(β = 0.51, p < .01). This demonstrates that when news reporting increasingly made the need for the international support of the affected
countries salient by using words such as support, countries, and community (support frame), the variety of frames also increased. Moreover,
the results suggest that a rise in presence of the victim frame was also
associated with a significant increase in news frame diversity in news
coverage (β = 0.60, p < .01). Specifically, increasing emphasis in words
such as family, sick, and Liberia in the news highlighting the need for
help (victim frame) resulted in more heterogeneous framing in news
media coverage. In sum, the findings of this analysis expose a framing process where the rise of certain frames pushes other frames from
the agenda, thereby decreasing news frame diversity, whereas other
frames seem to allow a plurality of frames in news media that coexist
alongside each other.
Frame Alignment and News Frame Diversity: VAR Model
(RQ3)

To explore the relationship between frame alignment and news frame
diversity, a VAR model was estimated. Table 3 displays the estimated
reciprocal effects of the two dependent variables. In addition, news attention was included in the model as an exogenous variable. The model
is absent of autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity, as indicated by the
Ljung–Box Q test and the Lagrange multiplier test (Vliegenthart, 2014),
revealing that the model is well specified. Moreover, the model explains
a considerable amount of variance of both series, with an R2 value of
.19 for new frame diversity and .41 for frame alignment.
The Granger causality test hints that frame alignment Grangercauses news frame diversity, indicated by the significant effect. Hence
the prediction of news frame diversity is increased by taking into account the level of frame alignment between the actors in the previous
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Granger Causality Tests for Frame Alignment and News Frame Diversity
Frame alignment

Frame alignment: Granger

News frame diversity
6.56*

News frame diversity
Granger

0.19

Ljung–Box Q(20)

16.56

17.86

Lagrange M-test (20)

21.38

14.90

AIC

25.55

BIC

38.65

R2

0.19

0.41

Note. The model includes the news attention as an exogenous variable. The AIC suggests that
a model with one lag is the most appropriate. AIC = Akaike information criterion. BIC = Bayes
information criterion.
*p < .05.

week. A reversed effect of news frame diversity on frame alignment is
not observed, indicating an asymmetrical relationship where only the
time series of frame alignment contains information about the time
series of frame diversity in news media coverage.
This is also reflected in Figure 1, which displays the times series for
news frame diversity and frame alignment with transformed z-scores.
The graph shows that changes in frame alignment often preceded
changes in news frame diversity, which suggests that an increase (decrease) in frame alignment resulted in an increase (decrease) in news
frame diversity. An impulse response function provides further insight.
The function indicates that a 1-point increase in frame alignment triggered an increase in .28 of news frame diversity in the following week.
While the effect is positive and immediate, the impact of the effect
declines slowly and gradually during the following weeks. In sum, the
results indicate that when frames between actors become more similar,
the diversity of frames in media increases. In other words, the results
suggest that a level of shared interpretations between news media and
GOs about what the crisis signifies resulted in more heterogeneous
framing in news media reporting, thereby answering RQ3.
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Discussion

The aim of this study was to shed light on the dynamic evolvement
of frames in news media coverage of the Ebola crisis (2014–2015) and
their interplay with frames promoted in GOs’ press releases. First, this
study automatically identified frames that both actors had constructed
(RQ1). The results reveal that frames such as the outbreak frame and
contagion frame were salient in both actors’ communication. This seems
to align with previous research that found that news media and their
cited sources were predominantly alarming during the coverage of the
A/H1N1 epidemic (Vasterman & Ruigrok, 2013). Perhaps these frames
can be classified by their immediate character and could therefore be
considered natural frames caused by the urgency and complexity that
result from the occurrence of a crisis, explaining why these frames are
prominent in the communication of both actors. At the same time,
other frames were actor specific (e.g., GOs: support frame; U.S. news
media: intensification frame), revealing differences in framing.
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The results suggest that frames that emphasized the perceived intensification of the crisis due to the proximity of the Ebola infections
(intensification frame, local infections frame) were strongly present in
news media coverage but were largely absent from the GOs’ agenda.
News coverage seemed to be heavily event driven and sensationalist,
with a focus on the hospitalization of U.S. individuals. In contrast, GOs’
press releases seemed to have focused on local interventions (support
frame) and broader economic consequences (consequences frame).
Considering Iyengar’s (1991) previously applied typology of episodic
and thematic frames, it seems news media coverage was more episodic
compared to GOs’ press releases. While this stands in contrast to findings of Lee and Basnyat (2013) in the context of the H1N1 crisis, it supports the results of Dudo et al. (2007) on the avian influenza coverage.
This might suggest that GOs paid little attention to local incidents,
possibly because the millions of cases in West Africa outweighed the
few U.S. infections. GOs might focus more strongly on providing
detailed information that is cross-validated and placing the events in
a broader global context (i.e., focus on thematic framing) rather than
spreading the newest developments in the crisis that can potentially
cause public panic. This explanation might indicate GOs’ awareness
of their public function as an expert information source and regulator
of public understanding.
Second, a partial adjusted ADL model was estimated, investigating
the relationship between the presence of identified news frames and
news frame diversity (RQ2). The results indicate that individual frames
have the potential to narrow or widen the media’s scope of frames and
therewith intensify or ease the crisis atmosphere (Kleinnijenhuis et
al., 2015).
On one hand, news frame diversity was decreased by frames that
emphasize the dramatic nature of the crisis and put specific events and
individuals at the center of reporting. Specifically, with an increasing
focus on the spread of the highly contagious virus (contagion frame)
and the first infections within the United States (intensification frame),
framing in news coverage became more homogenous. This observation is in line with previous research that has suggested that news
coverage during health crises is driven by specific incidents (Dudo et
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al., 2007; Shih et al., 2008) and that key events can lead to a focus on
fewer, event-oriented frames (Scheufele, 2006). The drop in news frame
diversity can, therefore, possibly be attributed to the intensification of
the situation. A perceived crisis escalation might have resulted in a
narrow focus (Suedfeld & Tetlock, 1977) and fostered a concentration
on problems (e.g., Kleinnijenhuis et al., 2015). Owing to the limited
capacity of news media (Zhu, 1992; Zhu & McCombs, 1995), alternative
viewpoints and interpretations remained absent, crowded out by these
predominant negative and sensational frames (Entman, 2003). Thus the
results also correspond with seminal research that has indicated that
specific crisis frames have the potential to temporarily displace alternative interpretations (e.g., Geiß et al., 2016) and conceal narratives that
promote alternative solutions to epidemics, such as local interventions
in Africa, that are context specific and address long-term implications
(Leach et al., 2010).
On the other hand, a rising emphasis on frames that focus more
strongly on the crisis progress and highlight the help needed for victims
(i.e., support frame and victim frame) increased news frame diversity.
This suggests that with the increasing presence of more constructive
news frames that emphasized the importance of supporting the affected
countries (support frame) and highlighted the impact of the crisis on a
broader scope (victim frame), the variety of narratives and interpretation also increased. These latter frames seem to have made the process
and development of the crisis salient from a wider and more inclusive
perspective, emphasizing the global scale of the events and introducing
possible solutions into coverage. Perhaps, these frames could therefore
be considered progressive frames. This effect might be related to a
progressing dialogue and exchange of information. Previous research
has observed that with the advancement of the crisis, news media
coverage became less alarming (Vasterman & Ruigrok, 2013) and more
open to a diverse set of narratives (Kleinnijenhuis et al., 2015), which
increased diversity and fostered a variety of perspectives on the situation (Wong et al., 2011). Thus it may be that as the news media turned
to the discussion of solutions, frame diversity increased. An alternative
explanation, however, should not be neglected. It is also plausible that
the presence of these two frames simply coincided with phases of higher
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frame diversity in news media reporting, which created the necessary
space in coverage for these alternative perspectives to arise.
Finally, a VAR model was estimated to analyze the relationship
between the level of frame alignment between actors and news frame
diversity (RQ3). The underlying question was whether heterogeneity
in perspectives in news media (high news frame diversity) creates the
basis for shared understanding about the events across actors (frame
alignment) or if a degree of shared interpretation of the crisis is at
the core of the media being open for a variety of interpretations. The
model provides evidence that an increase in frame alignment between
GOs and media produced greater frame diversity in news media. The
direction of the relationship seems to suggest that in the development
of a crisis, a degree of mutual understanding between actors about the
meaning of the events (Hellsten et al., 2010; Snow et al., 2007; Van der
Meer et al., 2014) is instrumental for news media to open up for diverse
narratives. Specifically, the rapprochement between the frames that
were offered by GOs and the frames present in news media coverage
appeared to have had a soothing effect on the news media coverage,
triggering a phase in which a variety of alternative information and
perspective were covered in the news. In times of crisis, news media
seem to reflect the social negotiation of how to frame the critical situation at play rather than lead how to interpret and communicate about
the crisis. The degree of alignment might have served as an indicator
for involved actors that a degree of consensus had been reached (Van
der Meer et al., 2014), the situation de-escalated (Weick, 1988), and
crisis atmosphere can ease.
The results of this study contribute to the body of literature on crisis
communication as well as framing theory and have certain practical
implications. First, the findings enrich the crisis literature by providing
further insight into the dynamic news media crisis coverage and how it
was affected by interaction with GOs. Epidemic outbreaks are dynamic
and complex processes with a variety of competing narratives (Leach et
al., 2010). This study applied time series analysis to provide insight into
the interaction of different frames, thereby answering the call for a more
complex and dynamic investigation of the communicative interplay
between actors in times of crisis (e.g., Schultz et al., 2012). Second, this
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study contributes to the literature on an empirical level by proposing
an innovative way to quantify the presence of automatically identified
frames in a large number of texts. In contrast to the majority of previous framing research on epidemics, this study followed an inductive
approach to identify frames, enabling the recognition of the full variety
of frames specific to the Ebola crisis (Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000).
Future health crisis research might benefit from applying a similar approach to identify frames unique to the crisis under study. Third, by
focusing on organizations from the public sector, this study started to
fill an important gap and enhances understanding of GOs’ interaction
with news media in times of crisis (Liu & Horsley, 2007; Schultz &
Raupp, 2010). Based on the results, it seems GOs need to recognize
the zero-sum dynamic in media coverage where narratives focusing
on the immediate problems of the crisis are likely to dominate news
media coverage. This narrow focus might have adverse consequences
for the crisis atmosphere and can hinder the emergence of solutions.
However, news media coverage appears to become more inclusive of
alternative narratives with the emergence of common interpretations
across actors. Thus GOs might benefit from adjusting their communication and signal acknowledgment of the immediate problems early to
allow a communicative shift toward an alternative more encompassing
discourse. By aligning their framing and crisis interpretations to the
news media coverage, GOs could stimulate an increase in frame diversity in news media coverage and thereby soothe the crisis atmosphere.
While this study makes some valuable contributions, a number of
shortcomings must be considered when interpreting the results. First,
the findings relate to a specific context of study, namely, Ebola in the
years 2014 and 2015 reported in U.S. newspapers, which limits its generalizability. Second, this study did not differentiate between U.S.-based
and international health organizations. Thus future research could
analyze whether different framing dynamics can be observed between
them. Third, the automated analysis started from the assumption that
bags of words are sufficient to retrieve the general meaning of the text.
Although this neglecting of syntax enables analyzing a large number of
texts (Grimmer & Stewart, 2013), it risks obscuring information. Finally,
despite the automatic identification of frames, the analysis faced a degree
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of subjective interference because frame presence was identified based
on manually created search strings. The method chosen to determine
the strings resulted, for some frames, in a limited number and selective combination of words, which might have influenced the findings.
Therefore future research should validate the results and see whether
the findings of the Ebola crisis also hold in other crisis situations.
Conclusion

To conclude, this study provides insight into the underlying communicative dynamics between news media and GOs that influence the
construction and evolvement of crises over time. Results of analyzing
the concepts of news frame diversity and frame alignment in communicative interplay during crisis demonstrate that shared interpretations
seem to foster the openness of news media for varying narratives.
Therefore timely and constructive communicative interaction between
the news media and GOs seems to have a soothing effect on news
media coverage.
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ABSTRACT
Fear of infectious disease has the potential to damage local economies, disrupt health care delivery systems, and diminish immune functioning, whether or not the risk is objectively high. The
appearance of Ebola in the United States offered an opportunity to study the causes of fear in a
real-world event. Shortly after the death of the first Ebola patient diagnosed in the United States,
survey data were gathered (N = 849) from residents of Dallas and U.S. citizens outside of Texas.
Fear was positively associated with age (younger), gender (female), and ethnicity (non-White), but
not geographic proximity (Dallas vs. not Dallas). Exposure to Ebola-related information via interpersonal channels (friends/family, acquaintances/coworkers) corresponded with higher levels of
fear, but the findings for media channels were more varied, showing positive effects (newspapers/
magazines), negative effects (Internet), and null effects (TV/radio). The study provides insight into
the personal, interpersonal, and media correlates of fear of Ebola.
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Although infectious diseases can produce devastating biological effects,
nonbiologic outcomes may be equally consequential (Lempel, Epstein,
& Hammond, 2009). Fear can decrease immune functioning, produce
delays in care seeking, and damage the local economy (Van Bortel et
al., 2016). Furthermore, such effects may occur whether or not fear of
the disease is objectively justified (Smith, 2006).
These observations underscore the importance of understanding
fear as a potential health problem in its own right. Surprisingly, only
a handful of studies have considered fear as the focus of investigation
(e.g., Nelissen, Beullens, Lemal, & van den Bulck, 2015). The 2014 arrival
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of Ebola in the United States presented an opportunity to address this
understudied issue by examining fear in response to a public health
crisis, notably, one that experts believed posed almost no danger to
the public at large.
The project embraced three broad questions. The first, concerned
with audience segmentation, focused on person-level correlates of fear.
Given the possibility of affective disparities, we tested for associations
between fear and gender, age, ethnicity, and proximity to the threat.
Second, in light of the intense news coverage of Ebola, we considered
the relationship between media exposure and fear. To complete the
picture (third), we examined the role of interpersonal communication. This was justified on the grounds that individuals often share
information about their emotional states and the causes thereof (Rimé,
2007). Our overarching goal was to produce a layered analysis of the
correlates of fear.
A Brief History of Ebola in the United States

Ebola produces a range of symptoms that include internal and external hemorrhaging (World Health Organization, 2015) and an average
case fatality rate of 50%. The outbreak that began in Africa in March
2014 eventually developed into the largest epidemic of Ebola in history
(Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2015). By summer of that
year, the epidemic began to draw increased attention from the U.S. press
and government that continued to grow in subsequent months. In a
September 16 press release, Lamar Alexander, senior Republican on
the Senate’s health committee, said, “This is one of the most explosive,
dangerous, deadly epidemics in modern times. . . . There is no known
cure. Half of those who get sick die” (U.S. Senate Committee on Health,
Education, Labor, and Pensions, 2014).
On September 30, 2014, Eric Thomas Duncan, a resident of Dallas
who had been traveling in Liberia, tested positive for Ebola. He died 8
days later. Duncan’s two nurses, Nina Pham and Amber Vinson, contracted the disease and became the second and third cases of Ebola in
the United States. What followed has been described as a media frenzy
(Bruinius, 2014). Indeed, media sources frequently used the phrase

Number of Ebola Stories in U.S. Newspapers
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Timeline of Ebola events and media coverage. In the LexisNexis Academic News
Sources database, we searched for articles with “Ebola” as keyword in both the title and the
body in U.S. newspapers from August 20 to October 29, 2014. To assess trends in media
coverage, we gathered data about the total number of Ebola-related news stories for 10-day
periods. The results are plotted as data points and connected with lines.
FIGURE 1

“epidemic of fear” to describe the mood of the country (e.g., Gilsinan,
2014). A Washington Post story reported that “this is both a biological
plague and a psychological one, and fear can spread even faster than
the virus” (Sun, Dennis, Bernstein, & Achenbach, 2014). Collectively,
these events warrant characterization of the situation as a megacrisis
(Sellnow-Richmond, George, & Sellnow, 2018). Figure 1 illustrates
media coverage of the disease along with notable Ebola-related events.
The Nature and Effects of Fear

Fear is a negatively valenced emotion that follows from the perception
that one is at risk of harm (Frijda, 1986; Lazarus, 1991). It is indexed in
the English language by a family of terms that range from worried to
terrified. Synonyms that lie near the center of the intensity continuum
include scared, afraid, and frightened (Ortony, Clore, & Collins, 1988).1 At
moderate levels, fear provides the motivational basis for self-protective
behaviors, such as information seeking (Kim & Niederdeppe, 2013).
But, when fear becomes more intense, it can constrict the perceptual
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field and preclude longer range thinking. Some writers have asserted
that infectious diseases may have special power to instill fright because
viral agents are invisible, colorless, and odorless (Alcabes, 2009). The
inability to directly perceive the threat can escalate worry into intense
fear and dread (Alcabes, 2009).
Problems associated with fear of infectious disease play out at three
levels (Van Bortel et al., 2016). Among individuals, fear may interfere
with the ability to perform one’s job and to successfully enact social
relationships (Tamir, 2016), as well as decrease job satisfaction and
increase stress (Hartley, Davila, Marquart, & Mullings, 2013). Fear and
related disorders, such as posttraumatic stress syndrome, have also been
associated with diminished cardiovascular fitness (Suls & Bunde, 2005),
decreased immune system functioning (Segerstrom, Solomon, Kemeny,
& Fahey, 1998), and degraded psychological health (Silver et al., 2013).
At the community level, fear can accelerate the spread of disease (Schulz
et al., 2016), cause delays in care seeking (Yamanis, Nolan, & Shepler,
2016), disrupt health care delivery systems (Barrett & Brown, 2008),
and diminish trust in health services (Van Bortel et al., 2016). Fear can
also produce unwanted outcomes at the state and national levels. For
instance, areas impacted by infectious diseases may experience loss
of investment and decreased tourism/travel (Lempel et al., 2009). In
sum, fear has the potential to produce seriously undesirable outcomes
depending on its intensity.
Personal Predictors of Fear: Demographics

It is generally accepted that there is value in understanding responses
to disasters via demographic grouping (Liu, Fraustino, & Jin, 2017).
Certain demographic variables have been associated with perceived
risk and emotional response. One is gender. Men perceive lower levels
of risk relative to women, a finding that is typically attributed to sociopolitical factors rather than biology or knowledge deficits (Finucane,
Slovic, Mertz, Flynn, & Satterfield, 2000; Flynn, Slovic, & Mertz, 1994).
Similarly, recent work has found that men report lower levels of fear to
a variety of stimuli. This relationship holds even after controlling for
gender role adherence (Campbell et al., 2016).
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Age, another demographic descriptor, generally shows an inverse
correlation with intensity of negative affect (Charles, Reynolds, &
Gatz, 2001). Socioemotional selectivity theory explains this relationship in terms of greater motivation to down-regulate negative feelings
(Carstensen, 2006). In contrast, the strength and vulnerability integration model emphasizes ability. Presumably, older individuals are
more skilled at emotion regulation than their younger counterparts
(Charles, 2010).
There is also evidence that ethnicity corresponds with perceived
risk and emotional response. Whites generally perceive lower levels of
environmental risk compared to non-Whites (Finucane et al., 2000;
Flynn et al., 1994), and following disasters, Whites show lower levels
of sadness, which is typically correlated with fear, than non-Whites
(Chu, Seery, Ence, Holman, & Silver, 2006). It has been argued that the
tendency for persons of African descent (vs. Whites) to report higher
levels of affect can be explained in terms of cultural differences that
place a higher value on emotions and emotional expression (White &
Parham, 1990).
The goal of this study was not to evaluate competing explanations
for these findings. Rather, we aimed to assess whether the same demographic variables might be useful for identifying segments of the
population that are especially prone to fear of infectious disease. Purely
on the basis of prior findings, the following was expected:
H1: Fear is negatively associated with (a) gender (male), (b) age, and
(c) ethnicity (White).

Personal Predictors of Fear: Proximity

Appraisal theories of emotion posit an explicit causal sequence that
leads to emotion arousal (Frijda, 1986; Lazarus, 1991). First, some change
takes place in the environment. Next, the individual appraises the implications of the change for his or her well-being. Assuming that the
change is seen as relevant, some emotion results, the type and intensity
of which depend on other appraisals. Fear, for example, requires that
the individual see the change as involving impending danger.
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Reason suggests that geographic proximity to a threat should enhance fear, probably due to perceptions of increased susceptibility and,
perhaps, severity. Research has borne this out. Ruiz and Hernandez
(2014) found that residents of the Canary Islands who were closer to
a volcanic eruption reported higher fear than those who were more
distant. Other studies have shown that fear increases as a function of
physical proximity to acts of terrorism (Holman, Garfin, & Silver, 2014;
Stitka, Bauman, & Mullen, 2004). Furthermore, analysis of Twitter data
revealed that the percentage of tweets expressing fear in countries with
confirmed cases of Ebola was higher than in adjacent countries, which
was higher than in distant countries (Zhuang, Peng, & Tang, 2018).
Given the appearance of Ebola in Dallas and the failure of the health
care system there to contain the disease, we anticipated that residents
of Dallas would experience higher levels of fear than persons in other
parts of the United States:
H2: Fear is positively associated with physical proximity to the threat.

Media and Interpersonal Predictors of Fear

It is possible for individuals to encounter hazards, such as infectious
disease, by contracting the malady themselves or by directly observing
its effects in others. This was true for the health professionals in Texas
who cared for Eric Thomas Duncan, Nina Pham, and Amber Vinson.
However, we suspect that it is more common for people to learn about
health threats from other people (including media) than directly. This
was the case for the millions of Americans who did not have direct
contact with Duncan, Pham, or Vinson. Thus it seems quite likely that
risk appraisal and the fear that follows from it are shaped by a variety
of indirect social processes. The social amplification of risk model
holds that individuals, groups, and institutions can act as amplification
stations that serve to amplify or attenuate risk perception when they
communicate about the hazard (Kasperson, Kasperson, Pidgeon, &
Slovic, 2003).2 Two such stations are media and interpersonal networks.
An abundance of research has shown that frequency of exposure to
risk information via mediated or interpersonal channels is a positive
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predictor of fear and/or risk. For instance, a meta-analysis of cultivation
research reported that frequency of exposure to television is positively
associated with perception of real-world violence (Morgan & Shanahan,
1997). Other work has indicated a positive relationship between media
exposure and health-related risk estimation (Coleman, 1993; Morton &
Duck, 2001), perceived disease severity (Young, Norman, & Humphreys,
2008), fear of cancer (Nelissen et al., 2015), and fear of terrorism (Nellis
& Savage, 2012; Silver et al., 2013). Shrum (2008) offered a cognitive
explanation for such effects when he asserted that frequency of activation is sufficient to enhance the accessibility of constructs in memory.
On this view, concepts become stronger and more easily activated as
a function of frequency of activation:
H3: Fear is positively associated with frequency of exposure to threat-

related information via media channels.

Although there are many ways to define interpersonal communication, it is commonly conceived to be interaction between two individuals
that takes place in real time (cf. Solomon & Theiss, 2013). Compared
to media research on risk and fear, findings regarding the effects of
interpersonal communication are fewer in number and less consistent.
For instance, Coleman (1993) found discussion effects for certain social
risks but not for personal risks, whereas Trumbo (1996) reported that
risk perceptions were driven by frequency of interpersonal discussion
only among individuals who are predisposed toward amplification of
risk. Work that assessed the perceived risks and benefits of a biological research facility showed frequency effects on benefits, but not risks
(Binder, Scheufele, Brossard, & Gunther, 2011). Thus, while the existing
literature is hardly univocal, there is evidence of frequency effects for
interpersonal discussion. The precise mechanism by which these effects
occur may be debated, but the simplest explanation is that message
repetition about a risky topic is sufficient to evoke fear regardless of
channel. As with mediated messages, frequency of concept activation
increases construct accessibility. Consequently, we make the following
hypothesis:

188

dillard and yang
H4: Fear is positively associated with frequency of exposure to threatrelated information via interpersonal channels.

Complexities in the Prediction of Fear?

Prior research has indicated that interpersonal communication may
interact with media exposure to alter individuals’ knowledge, attitudes, or behaviors, either by amplifying the impact of media or by
dampening it (e.g., Hardy & Scheufele, 2005; Scheufele, 2000, 2001,
2002; Southwell & Yzer, 2007, 2009). For example, Southwell (2005)
found that the positive relationship between adolescents’ exposure to
an antidrug advertisement and their memory of it was moderated by
interpersonal communications about the ad. Those who talked more
about the ad remembered the ad content better. Similarly, interpersonal
communication with family and friends has been shown to interact
with Internet and television use to affect healthy lifestyle behaviors
(Lee, 2009). Although previous research has seldom tested for this interaction on emotional response, it is plausible given that interpersonal
conversations can amplify perceived risk. Thus we ask the following:
RQ1: Does interpersonal communication moderate the relationship

between media exposure and fear of Ebola?

Although proximity to the outbreak of an infectious disease might
be expected to create more intense fear responses, that may not be the
only effect of location. Indeed, it seems likely that media tasked with
reporting on local news might give greater coverage to the event than
would national news. And residents of the city where the outbreak has
occurred could be more inclined to discuss the matter with friends,
family, and coworkers than would individuals at far remove. These
higher levels of communication might differ in content or emphasis,
making the threat appear more immediate or severe. These possibilities
raise the following question:
RQ2: Is fear partially determined by an interaction between proximity

and message exposure (media, interpersonal, or both)?
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Method
Sample and Participants

Participants were members of Qualtrics’s opt-in, online survey panel.
They received an invitation to participate via e-mail; provided data
between October 21 and 29, 2014 (cf. Figure 1); then subsequently
received compensation. As is generally the case with opt-in panels,
response rate cannot be assessed because the number of invitations
exceeds the a priori designated sample size. Once the target sample
size is reached, the survey closes, and it is not known how many more
participants would have accepted had it remained open.
Screening questions ensured that approximately half of the sample
resided in the Dallas metropolitan area, whereas the remainder was
balanced across census regions in the continental United States (but
not including Texas). With the elimination of the 16 persons who spent
more than 2 hours or fewer than 2 min completing the survey, the final
sample (N = 849) was 46% male and 54% female, ranging in age from
18 to 64 years (M = 40.59, SD = 14.01). As to ethnic identification, 74%
of participants identified as White, 14% as Black or African American,
9% as Hispanic, 5% as Asian or Pacific Islander, 3% as Native American
TABLE 1

Comparison of Dallasites and Non-Dallasites
Dallasites

Non-Dallasites

t or χ2

p-Value

Sample statistics

41

39

1.27

0.20

Population census data

32

37

Sample statistics

55

37

27.33

<0.001

Population census data

50

50

Sample statistics

71

78

5.13

0.02

Population census data

51

77

Age (mean in years)

Gender (male; %)

Ethnicity (White; %)

Note. Census data in the Non-Dallasites column are based on the entire United States, including
Dallas. Census data on age for both Dallasites and non-Dallasites are median values in 2014.
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or American Indian, and 2% as “other,” without specifying their ethnicity. Six percent of the participants identified with multiple ethnicities.
There were 417 respondents from the Dallas metropolitan area and
432 from outside of Texas. Table 1 presents demographic comparisons
of the two groups with one another and with census data. The study
was approved by the Institutional Review Board at Pennsylvania State
University.
Statistical Power

Assuming α = .05, two-tailed, and N = 849, power to detect a bivariate effect equal to r of .10 was .83. Thus the study possessed adequate
power to detect small effects.
Measurement
Demographics. Participants provided information on their gender
(male = 1; female = 0), ethnicity (White = 1; non-White = 0), and age
in years.
Proximity. A screening question asked respondents whether or not
they lived in Dallas. Responses were verified against longitude and
latitude data provided by Qualtrics. Location was a binary variable,
where Dallas = 1 and not Dallas = −1.
Message exposure via media and interpersonal channels. Level
of exposure was estimated by asking respondents to estimate how often they have encountered information, in the past couple of months,
about Ebola in newspapers or magazines; on television or radio; on the
Internet; in conversation with friends or family; and in conversation
with acquaintances, coworkers, or strangers. Judgments were made
on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (never) to 5 (more than 10 times). An
index of interpersonal communication of Ebola information was created by averaging the two interpersonal channel items given that they
were moderately correlated (r = .66, α = .80) and their relationships
with other variables were parallel.
Fear. Using a response scale ranging from 0 (none of this emotion)
to 4 (a great deal of this emotion), respondents were asked to mark the
numerical values that best indicated how the current news about Ebola
made them feel. Two items were drawn from a larger set of items whose
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Descriptive Statistics
M (SD)

1

2

3

4

1. Newspapers/mags

2.86 (1.51)

–

2. TV/radio

3.99a (1.27)

0.36*

–

3. Internet

3.68 (1.37)

0.40*

0.34*

–

4. Interpersonal
  communication

3.12a (1.23)

0.44*

0.44*

0.50*

0.80

5. Fear

1.62b (1.28)

0.13*

0.01

0.02

0.15*

a

a

5

0.91

Note. N = 849. Values in the diagonal are Cronbach’s alpha.
a

Possible range = 1–5. bPossible range = 0–4.

*p < .001.

validity had been established in previous research (Dillard & Shen,
2006). Given strong correlations with the latent variable fear (in those
studies), it was determined that two items were sufficient to create a
reliable index. Thus, to minimize respondent fatigue, we utilized only
afraid and scared (α = .91).
Results
Descriptive Results

As shown in Table 2, on a 0–4 scale, the mean value for fear was 1.62.
However, the sample showed responses across the full range of the
scale. For the five Ebola-related message exposure variables, the means
ranged from 2.86 to 3.99 on a 1–5 scale, which suggested medium to
high levels of exposure to Ebola-related information.
Model Fitting

Two regression analyses were conducted with fear as the dependent
variable. In both cases, the person variables were entered first as a block,
followed by the mean-centered measures of mediated and interpersonal
message exposure variables in the second block. In one analysis, the
third block contained interaction terms for media and interpersonal
exposure variables. In the other analysis, the third block contained
product terms for location (+1/−1), with each of the mean-centered
exposure indices. The results are given in Table 3.
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Regression Analyses Predicting Fear

Block
1

2

3a

3b

Predictor

B

95% CI

β

R

R2Δ

.17

.03***

.26

.04***

.27

.004

.28

.002

Gender (male)

−.31

−.48,
−.13

−.12**

Age

−.01

−.01,
−.000

−.07*

Ethnicity (White)

−.19

−.39,
.004

−.07+

Proximity (Dallas)

−.05

−.14, .04

−.04

Newspapers/mags

.10

.03, .16

TV/radio

−.04

−.12, .04

Internet

−.11

−.18,
−.03

Interpersonal

.19

.10, .28

Interpersonal ×
Newspapers/Mags

.04

−.01, .09

−.06

Interpersonal × TV/Radio

.01

−.06, .07

.01

Interpersonal × Internet

−.04

−.11, .02

−.06

Proximity × Newspapers/
Mags

−.01

−.08, .06

−.01

Proximity × TV/Radio

.01

−.07, .09

.01

Proximity × Internet

.03

−.05, .10

.03

−.01

−.11, .08

−.01

Proximity × Interpersonal

.11**
−.04
−.12**
.18***

Note. N = 849. Regression coefficients in Block 1 were estimated using only predictors in that
block. The Block 2 estimates are based on the full set of predictors in Blocks 1 and 2. Similarly,
Block 3 estimates are based on all prior blocks.
p = .055. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

+

Hypothesis Tests

H1a, which predicted a negative association with gender, was supported.
The standardized coefficient, β = −.12, p = .001, indicated that men
reported lower levels of fear than women. H1b anticipated a negative
relationship between age and fear. With β = −.07, p = .039, the hypothesis was supported. Older respondents experienced fear less intensely
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than their younger counterparts. H1c predicted a negative coefficient
for ethnicity, which was borderline significant, β = −.07, p = .055.
H2 specified a positive association between proximity to the outbreak
and fear. Because the observed difference between Dallas residents and
nonresidents was not significant, β = −.04, p = .277, this hypothesis was
not supported.
H3 predicted positive associations between fear and indices of media exposure. The regression analysis estimated these relationships as
follows: for newspapers/magazines, β = .12, p = .003; for TV/radio, β =
−.04, p = .341; for Internet, β = −.12, p = .005. Support for H3 was mixed.
Similarly, H4 anticipated positive effects for interpersonal exposure
on fear. Indeed, exposure to Ebola information via interpersonal channels significantly predicted fear, β = .18, p < .001. Thus H4 was supported.
RQ1 focused on the interaction effects between interpersonal and
media exposure to Ebola messages (see Block 3a in Table 3). We used
the mean-centered interpersonal and media exposure variables to create the interaction terms (product terms). R2 change for the block was
.004, p = .351. None of the terms was significant. Thus there was no
interaction effect of message exposure on fear via different channels.
RQ2 examined the potential for proximity and message exposure
to interact in their effect on fear. Block 3b of Table 3 assessed the data
for these interactions. R2 change for the block was .002, p = .839, and
none of the individual terms was significant. Thus message exposure
effects were not conditioned on location.
Discussion
The Intensity of Fear

A majority of our sample (80%) reported experiencing some degree of
fear (i.e., >0 on a 0–4 scale). Yet, the mean value of 1.62 seemed rather
modest and not in keeping with news characterizations of the public
mood as an “epidemic of fear and anxiety” (Harlan, 2014). To put these
values in perspective, it may be useful to consider two points of reference. On one hand, levels of fear and perceived threat in the data were
comparable to the SARS outbreak in 2003 and the H1N1 pandemic
in 2009. In both cases, more than half of the Americans surveyed
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indicated that they were not that worried about the threat (Moore, 2003;
Pew Research Center, 2003, 2009; Saad, 2009). From this, it seemed
sensible to conclude that the Ebola crisis was nontrivial but that media
interpretations of it were overblown.
On the other hand, Americans were far more concerned than they
should have been. The level of fear reported by our sample might be
viewed as a vast overreaction to the true risk posed by Ebola. Indeed,
one Internet meme held that Americans were more likely to marry a
Kardashian (n = 3) than to die from Ebola (n = 1). According to health
experts (e.g., Friedman & Schapiro, 2014), the Kardashian comparison
was reasonably accurate. Thus the series of events was psychologically
significant for many members of the public, despite the fact that high
levels of fear were not objectively justified.
Personal Predictors of Fear: Demographics

Demographic variables were included in this study to determine whether fear varied as a function of group membership. On this point, the
data provided some reasonably clear answers. Persons who were female, younger, and non-White all showed heightened levels of fear of
Ebola. These results are consistent with prior research showing that
membership in these categories is associated with higher fear levels
for other sorts of adverse events (e.g., Campbell et al., 2016; Charles,
Reynolds, & Gatz, 2001; Chu et al., 2006). To the extent that Ebola is
representative of other infectious diseases, this provides a rationale for
demographically targeted communication efforts designed to reduce
public fear during times of crisis.
The results also suggest the existence of a heretofore unidentified
form of health disparity, one based on emotional response. Members of
these demographically defined groups, and especially those who belong
to multiple categories, are at relatively greater risk for the subjective
experience of fear as well as downstream effects, such as diminished
biological and psychological health (Segerstrom et al., 1998; Silver
et al., 2013).
There is, however, one important qualification to these conclusions. Because our sample was 74% White, we were unable to provide
meaningful tests of differences among minority groups (which have
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been observed in some previous work, e.g., Chu et al., 2006). More
research is needed to better understand the prevalence and basis of
group differences.
Personal Predictors of Fear: Proximity

A proximity effect was anticipated, such that Dallasites would be more
frightened than persons living outside of Texas. Because the data did
not show the expected effect, we considered alternative explanations.
One was that media content varied in ways that dampened fear in Dallas or exacerbated it outside of Texas. With the aim of exploring this
possibility, we searched for, but did not find, systematic comparisons
of communication content in Dallas versus not Dallas. However, an
analysis of one Canadian and one Nigerian newspaper offered an analog (Humphries, Radice, & Lauzier, 2017). Two consistent themes in
the Canadian paper, which was geographically distant from the threat
of Ebola, were an emphasis on global responsibility for combating
the disease and the need for the Canadian government to stop Ebola
before it spread into Western nations. The Nigerian paper, in contrast,
focused on the risks of Ebola and the actions undertaken locally to
safeguard the population. In addition, the Nigerian outlet more frequently critiqued Western coverage of Ebola as sensationalistic and
actively resisted perceived stigmatization of Nigerians. In other words,
the Canadian “outsider” paper framed Ebola more reactively, whereas
the Nigerian “insider” publication gave greater emphasis to action
and ingroup solidarity. Although our reasoning is obviously speculative, if the same communication dynamics were at work in our U.S.
sample, they may have been responsible for the absence of a proximity
effect in the data.
Another possibility is that precisely the opposite occurred; that is,
rather than different locales producing different content, it is conceivable that news coverage did not vary. On this view, the Ebola crisis was
treated by all news outlets as a national issue, and the public, regardless
of location, perceived it as such. This account aligns well with Holman
et al.’s (2014) data. Their work on the Boston Marathon bombing found
no effect for physical proximity on acute stress symptoms but a positive, linear effect for media exposure. Together, the two results suggest
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a media environment that defines the crisis broadly enough to override
the influence of geography.
Both possibilities are compatible with one broader point. Although
we thought it plausible that individuals closer to the threat would see
themselves as more susceptible to it (and therefore experience greater
fear), physical distance is not synonymous with psychological distance
(Trope & Liberman, 2010). Going forward, researchers may wish to
examine factors that moderate the correspondence between these two
related but independent forms of distance.
Media and Interpersonal Predictors of Fear

The social amplification of risk model asserts that amplification stations
function to modulate perceptions of risk, by either magnification or
minimization. Our results are intriguing in that they demonstrate effects
of both sorts as well as a null effect for TV/radio. As for amplification,
frequency of exposure via newspapers/magazines showed the anticipated positive association with fear. This result echoes findings from
many previous studies that reported an influence of media exposure
on risk (e.g., Coleman, 1993; Young et al., 2008) but joins a relatively
small number of investigations that found a parallel effect on fear
(Nelissen et al., 2015; Silver et al., 2013). Interpersonal communication
also showed positive relationships such that more frequent exposure
to Ebola-related communication led to higher levels of fear of Ebola.
The observed effect of exposure is compatible with theories of
memory that hold that semantically related words or concepts co-occur
with the target more easily and frequently (Anderson, 1983; Dosher &
Rosedale, 1989). Repeated exposure to the same stimuli has been found
to facilitate memory of the stimuli—a phenomenon known as repetition
priming (Logan, 1990). According to these theories, simple mention of
Ebola should be sufficient to activate the cognitive appraisals that are
responsible for fear.
That simple account is challenged, however, by the findings for TV/
radio, which showed no detectable association with fear, and for Internet
exposure, which was negatively correlated with fear. At the broadest
level, these results are important in that they empirically illustrate the
potential for different amplification stations to produce countervailing
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(or no) effects for a specific threat. Although it is unclear whether this
pattern of results is unique to Ebola or generalizable to other infectious
diseases, it underscores the need to consider the interplay of influences
within and across the categories of interpersonal and mediated communication.
At a more specific level, the study showed that newspapers/magazines were positively associated with fear, whereas Internet usage produced a negative association. While a definitive account of the findings
is not possible, personal agency and message content may both play
a role. In contrast to the sensationalism of corporate media, active
seekers of information about Ebola may have sought and found—via
the Internet—credible sources of health information, most which were
saying that the risk of Ebola in the United States was vanishingly small
(Friedman & Schapiro, 2014).
Complex Influences on Fear?

No interpersonal/media interaction effect was observed in this study.
In other words, there was no indication that conversations about Ebola
magnified or minimized the impact of media exposure on fear. Naturally, this raises the question of why interaction effects appear in some
studies (e.g., Lee, 2009) and not others (e.g., the current project).
Simply posing this question highlights a lacuna in the research literature. Although the possibility of interpersonal/media interactions has
been raised, there is currently no theory designed to explain when or
why such effects should be expected. Because research has suggested
multiple factors that might govern the effect—message function, format, timing, topic, and network density (Southwell & Yzer, 2009)—it
is clear that constructing such a theory will be a nontrivial, but much
needed, undertaking.
In a similar vein, we considered the possibility that location would
interact with message exposure. None of the four tests was significant. Although Ebola-related message exposure was generally higher
in Dallas versus outside of Texas, there was no indication that the
exposure–fear association varied in strength as a function of location.
This null effect could be due to Ebola being seen as a national rather
than local phenomenon at the time of our investigation. Indeed, many
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newsworthy events took place beyond the Texas border. Schools were
closed in Ohio as well as in Texas (Szabo, 2014), and both New York
and New Jersey imposed a quarantine on travelers with possible Ebola
contacts (Thompson, 2014). Of course, the possibility of sampling error
cannot be ruled out.
Strengths and Limitations

This investigation has several noteworthy strengths, including a relatively large sample gathered at a critical moment in the unfolding of a
real-world event. In addition, the results are reasonably clear, offering
support for some expectations and an unequivocal lack of support for
others.
Of course, the study also possesses noteworthy limitations. It is hard
to generalize the findings to other infectious diseases given that the
data are limited to one disease in one Western country at one point in
history. Second, strictly speaking, cross-sectional data preclude causal
inference. However, the nature of the variables under study tempers this
principle. For example, it seems implausible that fear of Ebola exerted a
causal influence on individuals’ reporting of their gender, age, ethnicity, or location. However cross-sectional data do not allow us to rule
out the possibility that fear influenced reporting of interpersonal and
media exposure measures. But, at least in the case of media exposure,
there is evidence that self-reports are reasonably valid indicators of
more objective measures of the same variable (Southwell, Barmada,
Hornik, & Maklan, 2002). Additional research using longitudinal or
experimental designs is needed to sort out questions of causal flow.
Third, the nonprobability sample was not representative of the nation generally nor of Dallas specifically. Accordingly, point estimates in
our data must be viewed with caution. Another substantial limitation
to this investigation was the absence of measures of communication
content. Having such information would have aided our interpretation
of several findings, especially those concerned with interpersonal and
media exposure. Future research would benefit from the inclusion of
even gross indices of content. Work that links content analysis of media
with individual-level data on interpersonal communication and fear
would be especially valuable.
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Finally, our indices of communication were relatively crude. Interpersonal communication was undefined for participants, which may
have introduced error into the data to the extent that interpretations
of the phrase varied across the sample. And the media measures were
not sufficiently granular to capture exposure via social media channels like Instagram and Twitter (Sellnow-Richmond et al., 2018). Both
weaknesses should be corrected in future research.
Conclusions

Using data gathered near the peak of a perceived disease crisis, this study
yielded several important findings: (a) Widespread fear of infectious
disease is possible, even when the objective level of risk is extremely
low; (b) being young, female, and non-White are risk factors for high
levels of fear; and (c) media and interpersonal amplification stations are
likely complicit in magnifying fear but (d) can also serve to counteract
it. Collectively, these observations contribute to our general understanding of public reactions to infectious disease and point the way forward
toward interventions designed to mitigate negative emotional reactions.
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Notes
1. Of course, not everyone agrees. For example, Gray and McNaughton
(2000) contended that fear is an acute response to immediate danger that can
be remedied, whereas anxiety is a response to a future threat that cannot be
avoided. Lazarus (1991) differentiated them in terms of physical versus existential threat. However, even inventories designed to measure fear and anxiety
as separate constructs find an average correlation of .46 (Sylvers, Lilienfeld, &
LaPrairie, 2011). Though it may be useful to distinguish fear and anxiety for
certain purposes, we see their difference mostly as a matter of degree.
2. The terminology is regrettable in that stations can amplify or attenuate perceptions of risk. Phrasing such as modulation stations would more accurately convey what is meant. But, because the phrase amplification stations
is now embedded into the research literature, we bow to previous usage.
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ABSTRACT
How do European Union (EU) member states communicate risks to their citizens? In this study, we
define risk communication as the information provided by different levels of government to citizens
regarding possible future crises to which the general public might be subjected. We seek to answer
the following questions: Are there any patterns in the risk communication strategies among EU
member states in terms of the sender of information, the message conveyed, the method used,
and the intended audience? Finally, to what extent is the state involved in ensuring the safety of
its citizens? To tackle these questions, we examine the risk communication strategy of eight countries: Sweden, Finland, Germany, England, France, Estonia, Greece, and Cyprus. Our data consist of
governmental web sites, publications, campaigns, and other modes of communication, such as
videos posted on YouTube, with questions centering on institutional actors, methods of delivery,
content, and effectiveness. We find that the institutional architecture of risk communication aligns
with the broad administrative system of each member state. Countries tend to focus on risks that
are specific to their context, with Sweden and, to a lesser extent, Germany having a special focus
on consequences and providing guidelines to the public on how to survive for a certain period
of time in the absence of the state. Especially in Sweden, though the state is a salient actor in risk
communication through the dissemination of information at the agency level, the state retreats
while urging the resilient citizen to take control of his or her own crisis management.
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era (Dwyer, 2018) and began with a message stating that even though
Sweden was safer than many other countries, it faced threats that
might jeopardize its security and independence (Myndigheten för
samhällsskydd och beredskap, 2018).
Recent events with national repercussions for Sweden include the
looming Russian geopolitical threat, the terrorist attack in central
Stockholm in April 2017, the forest fires in Västmanland of 2014 (see
Öhman, Giritli Nygren, & Olofsson, 2016), and the extensive forest
fires in summer 2018. The cultural imagination of realized disasters
and many other chimerical ones influences the response to current
challenges. The “emergency imaginary” dictates the perception of disasters among professionals (Gregersen & Winkel Holm, n.d.), and in
turn, this perception determines what risks professionals communicate
to the public and how they do so. More specifically, Calhoun (2008)
theorized that framing events as emergencies shapes the way in which
we understand aberrant (perhaps) events, such as inter alia crises,
disasters, and international conflicts, and delineates the range of acceptable actions. The emergency imaginary is a way of conceptualizing
problematic events, foregrounding their “unpredictability, abnormality,
and brevity” while concomitantly pointing to their attendant corollary:
intervention (Calhoun, 2008, p. 375). Calhoun treated the issue of international emergencies and humanitarian intervention, but theoretically,
we can scale down and consider problematic events at the micro level
and what intervention at the individual level might look like.
Calhoun (2008) also noted that attention must be paid to the ways
risks and threats are conceptualized so that we may understand “the
social organization of fear” (p. 381), on one hand, and, on the other,
how the sense of vulnerability is distributed. This is not a new concept
in risk communication research, and in this study, we consider risk
communication specifically at the preparedness phase, which
is designed to understand and address the public’s awareness and
knowledge gaps related to risk events, to elicit desired preparedness
behaviors through identifying and utilizing effective communication
channels, to ensure adequate understanding, and to educate about what
actions to take when messages are issued. (Sheppard, Janoske, & Liu,
2012, p. 11; see also Leiss, 1996; Lofstedt, 2010)
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The empirical impetus for this research was the striking catholic and
centralized nature of the aforementioned communiqué issued by the
Swedish state. Our study aims at filling the apparent lacuna of crosscountry European comparisons when it comes to risk communication
at the preparedness phase (see, however, Infanti et al., 2013; Lofstedt,
2010; Tourenq, Boustras, & Gutteling, 2017 for a set of guidelines). From
a theoretical perspective, we seek to uncover the architecture (actors,
institutions, and the degree of their involvement, message, method,
and audience) as part of the risk communication process. In other
words, our research question is as follows: How is this imaginary of
emergencies in Europe reflected in the content of risk communication
messages issued by governmental organizations?
To answer this question, we conducted a comparative study of eight
European Union (EU) member states with the objective to map the
institutional risk communication structure, the messages that these
actors send, how these messages are conveyed, and to whom.
Literature Review

Risk communication as a research area is broad and diversified, including areas such as risk perception, risk and emotions, social construction of risk, media communication, framing, social movements, public
engagement, and, not least, crisis communication (Cho, Reimer, & McComas, 2006; Ulmer, Sellnow, & Seeger, 2011). Therefore, whenever we
study “risk communication,” we need to define our object of inquiry and
thus delimit our investigation. In this article, we investigated national
and subnational risk communication and more specifically the way
different European countries have designed their risk communication
architecture regarding possible future crises where the receiver is the
public at large.
Empirically and theoretically focused research has targeted the
receivers’ information seeking (Alaszewski, 2005), perception of risk
communication tools and messages (Slovic, 1999), trust in communicators (Renn & Levine, 1991), vulnerabilities (Fothergill, Maestas,
& Darlington, 1999), and sociocultural contexts (Wardman, 2014).
Although such research has produced insight and guidelines regarding
these different core aspects of risk communication, relatively few studies
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have focused on public policy, particularly in a comparative perspective.
Two exceptions are the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) report Trends in Risk Communication Policies and
Practices from 2016, which reviewed the risk communication systems
of 19 countries, and the 2017 study authored by Tourenq, Boustras, and
Gutteling that compared the policy design of Cyprus, France, and the
Netherlands (see also Infanti et al.’s 2013 literature review on effective
risk communication in Europe). Reflecting the risk communication
literature, the OECD (2016) defined six criteria for effective risk communication:
•
•
•
•
•
•

Consistency across different risk communication tools.
Two-way communication and interactive approaches.
Accuracy and trust. Best available knowledge should be used
in a transparent way.
Accessibility of information for citizens, NGOs (non-governmental organizations) and private organizations to seek and use.
Information adapted to the audience’s cognitive capacities, their
exposure or vulnerability.
Cross-sectoral and trans-boundary, reflecting the cross-border,
multiple dimensions and possible cascading effects of threats
and hazards. (p. 30)

The report illustrates how risk communication systems may be understood and evaluated based on these criteria and the state of the art
(e.g., Hampel, 2006; Leiss, 1996; Renn & Levine, 1991; Ulmer et al.,
2011). See Table 1.
The conclusions of the report partly indicate that national risk communication needs to be more inclusive and interactive and to focus more
on prevention, that is, provide more information about what people can
do to mitigate their exposure to risk. Tourenq, Boustras, and Gutteling
(2017) argued similarly in a comparative study of Cyprus, France, and
the Netherlands. They evaluated available information on the countries’ websites based on the assumption that two-way communication
enhances individual preparedness and resilience. They found that both
France and the Netherlands had interactive communication and that
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Core Elements of a National Risk Communication System
Element

Description

Governance

Who is in charge of risk communication, and what is the
institutional structure of risk communication governance?

Considering all hazards and
forward thinking

How comprehensive and forward oriented are national risk
communication practices?

Purpose of communication
and activation of target
audience

What is the purpose of countries’ risk communication,
and how is the target audience involved to effectively
communicate risk?

Focus on prevention

How prevention focused are national risk communication
practices?

Tapping into innovation

What is the role of innovative technologies in countries’
risk communication practices?

Evaluation

What is the effect of risk communication, and how is it
being measured?

Note. Based on OECD (2016).

the Netherlands particularly focused on the individual citizen’s ability
not only to manage but also to prepare for crises. The risk communication of Cyprus, conversely, was exclusively one way, providing expert
information for the purpose of “educating people” (Tourenq et al.,
2017, p. 547). Arguably, there exist two different assumptions on which
risk communication architecture is based: the “educate the public” approach, where citizens are seen as passive and unknowledgeable, and
the “resilient citizen” approach, where citizens are not only active and
knowledgeable but also seeking responsibility for themselves and the
community (see Aradau, 2014).
This leads us to the orientation of this article, which is a critical
perspective of risk and risk communication as constituent components
of the imaginary of emergencies (Boisseau, Feltey, Flynn, Gelfand, &
Triece, 2008; Calhoun, 2008). Risk and its communication create a
demand for changes to society and to individuals: Risk may be viewed
as a concept intent on exercising power (Wilkinson, 2009). The notion
of risk can thus serve as a control technique expressing the interaction
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of power relationships (Hannah-Moffat & O’Malley, 2007). This opens
up for questions of how notions of risk come to “delimit what it is
possible to think and say at a particular time, what purpose does this
serve, and to whose benefit?” (Wardman, 2008, p. 1633), or as Calhoun
(2008, p. 381) put it, how the conceptualization of risk impacts on the
social organization of fear. In some cases, inequalities are (re)produced
by modes of governance, including the use of “risk” as a regulatory
regime that is shaped by power imbalances (Giritli Nygren, Öhman, &
Olofsson, 2017; Montelius & Giritli Nygren, 2014). Risk communication
often aims at supporting vulnerable populations, but by making the
power dimension of risk communication and its intersection with other
lines of power visible, we allow for an analysis of risk communication
practices that does not hide the reproduction of existing norms and
social inequality.
For this reason, we pay special attention to the issue of representativeness. The audience of risk communication consists of diverse publics,
necessitating a certain tailoring of the message to establish trust and
collaboration (Janoske, Liu, & Sheppard, 2012). Janoske et al. reported
on children, the elderly and disabled, and racial and ethnic minorities.
We considered risk communication aimed at transient populations as
well as people living in rural areas in our study in an effort to broaden
the diversity of publics under consideration.
In summary, there is a paucity of cross-country comparative research
examining such issues as risk communication policies, institutional actors, the intended recipient and message content, and even fewer with
a critical component. The extant international comparisons, though
they provide an important starting point for thinking about risk communication in comparative terms, do not go far enough in addressing
the imaginary of emergencies in Europe and nuances among countries under investigation. For example, Tourenq et al. (2017) mentioned factors such as “history, people, management, and lack of funds”
(pp. 546–547) but do not go any further. This article adds to the limited
knowledge of risk communication at the national and subnational
levels (Infanti et al., 2013) but also expands the analysis with a systematic
comparison among EU countries. Such comparison has a number of
practical implications. Different countries often face not only similar
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risks but also risks that stretch over national boundaries. The insight
into how countries perceive and communicate risk and prepare for
crises has the potential to facilitate coordination in the face of an
extraordinary event. A recent example of a European civil protection
mobilization took place in summer 2018 when the coordinated effort
of eight countries assisted Sweden in battling destructive forest fires
(European Commission, 2018).
Research Design, Method, and Data

This is a qualitative systematic comparison aiming at capturing as much
variation as possible among EU member states. To fulfill the objective
of maximum variation in the cases selected, the logic of comparison is a
variation of the “most different systems” logic, which is a logic of systematic cross-country comparison first articulated by Przeworski and
Teune (1970; see also Collier, 1993; Meckstroth, 1975). Rather than uncovering causal relationships, the eight-country comparison contrasted
contexts to establish a framework for understanding how risk communication processes play out in different ways in each context. This interpretive dimension in social sciences is accommodated within small N comparative studies as elaborated in Skocpol and Somers (1980). The authors
posited that asking the same or similar analytical questions in contrasting contexts may highlight divergences, making them more transparent—though this is not a causal analysis producing sweeping theory.
To that end, the selection of cases covered the entire geographic
gamut of the EU 28. Geography is relevant because it partly (though
not exclusively) determines what kind of events might be conceived as
threats by each country. Additionally, geography functions as a kind
of proxy for the historical contingences idiosyncratic to each country.
Traditionally, Greece and Cyprus belong to the European South; France
and Germany are in Western Europe (though Germany is sometimes
classified as Central) and Sweden and Finland belong to Northern
Europe, while Estonia is part of Eastern Europe. The British Isles here
are considered a part of Western Europe,1 though elsewhere they may
be classified as a region of their own (Libraries of the University of
Minnesota, 2012).
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Thematic Guide for Data Analysis
Category

Institutional actors

Constituent questions
What institutional actors are involved in the risk
communication process?
Are there any nongovernmental organizations involved,
and if so, how?

Method

How is the message communicated to the public?
Is the communication in any language other than the
official language for each country investigated? If that is the
case, is the message the same?
Are there any provisions to spread the message to
subgroups of the population, such as (a) people with
disabilities, (b) nonnative speakers (tourists or immigrants),
(c) people in elderly care, (d) the homeless.
What kinds of media (videos, pictures, text) are used to
convey the message?

Content

What kinds of risks and potential crises do the countries
under comparison take up?
Are there any campaigns (with or without a timeline)
geared toward raising public awareness when it comes to
crisis preparedness? If so, what do these campaigns look
like?

Effectiveness

Have there been any evaluations assessing the effectiveness
of the risk communication tools?

Additionally, the countries under examination covered the entire
typology range of public administration systems in Europe (Kuhlmann
& Wollmann, 2014). This is relevant because risk communication is
part of the public administration arrangements of each case in terms of
institutions involved, message conveyed, and so on. France and Greece
belong to the Continental European Napoleonic model, characterized
by a strong centralized government and a powerful centralized bureaucracy, which means that the subnational and local levels are considered
to be subordinate. In contrast, in the Continental European Federal
model (Germany), the central bureaucracy is weaker, and the subnational, decentralized institutions have more power. In the Scandinavian
model (Sweden, Finland), the administrative structure is also highly
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decentralized, while the most salient feature of the Anglo-Saxon model
(England and, to a certain extent, Cyprus) is new public management
decentralized managerial practices (Kuhlmann & Wollmann, 2014). In
Estonia, we capture the postcommunist environment with the attendant
interventionist state.
Our investigation was conducted on publicly available text and images (still and video) comprising risk communication material at the
preparedness phase. Data included information about risks, warnings,
self-protection guidelines, and other publications geared toward various
publics on outlets (official websites, YouTube channels, and Facebook
groups) authored and curated by public entities of, or related to, civil
protection or civil defense. We, the authors, have native or near-native
linguistic competence as well as country-specific knowledge of the
countries we compared. This eliminated any linguistic or cultural misunderstandings and allowed for a nuanced analysis of texts and images.
We asked the same questions of the data, thematically arranged and
summarized in Table 2. We used these questions to address the core
elements of a national risk communication system (see Table 1) and,
in turn, unpack the imaginary of emergencies.
Results

In this section, we present the results of the data analysis based on
the thematic guide presented in Table 2. The purpose of the analysis
is to understand how the imaginary of emergencies (Calhoun, 2008)
is reflected in the risk communication practices of the eight selected
countries by fleshing out any convergent as well as divergent points
among them, structured after the items in Table 1.
Governance Arrangements: Who Is in Charge of Risk
Communication?

The degree of the centralization of responsibility for risk communication varies among the countries under comparison, generally along the
lines of their administrative system. The institutional risk communication architecture in the Scandinavian countries follows the corporatist
model with civil society and the local level being important actors and
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builds on collaboration among agencies and municipalities as well as
the involvement of private and volunteer sectors. The Swedish Civil
Contingencies Agency (MSB), placed under the Ministry of Justice, and
the Finnish department for Rescue Services have strategic, coordinating, and supportive responsibilities. More specifically, the Swedish MSB
provides information to the public mainly through two websites (http://
www.dinsakerket.se/ and http://www.krisinformation.se/), though the
websites of county administrative boards and municipalities also convey
information to the public. The Finnish Rescue Services are responsible
for preventing accidents, providing emergency services, and protecting
the population in exceptional circumstances at the regional level and are
also responsible for civil defense (Finnish Ministry of the Interior, 2018).
Conversely, France and Greece, in Western and Southern Europe,
respectively, follow the continental Napoleonic model, and unsurprisingly, the national government is in charge of what is communicated
and how. In France, the General Secretariat for Defense and National
Security (SGDSN) in the Ministry of the Interior coordinates the national plans that serve as decision support tools at the national level.
The secretariat supports the prime minister and the president in their
role as crisis managers and is also responsible for civil defense (Gouvernement Français, 2018a). Similarly, in Greece, civil protection issues
are handled by the General Secretariat for Civil Protection established
in 1995 and tasked with coordinating risk communication to citizens
both in general terms and during exceptional circumstances (Republic
of Greece, 2002).
The Estonian Rescue Board, the third largest public service institution in Estonia, is the main actor in risk communication (Päästeamet,
2017), whereas in England, the substance and method of delivery of
risk communication are the responsibility of Local Resilience Forums.
These are not legal entities but “collaborative mechanisms” that “have a
collective responsibility to plan, prepare and communicate in a multiagency environment” (Cabinet Office, 2013, p. 3). Most of these follow
police force boundaries (Garton Grimwood, 2017). The organization
with leading responsibilities in emergency management is the Civil
Contingencies Secretariat in the Cabinet Office, established in 2001
(Cabinet Office, 2013).
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In Germany, the institution responsible for informing the public
of risks and potential crises is the German Federal Office of Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance (Bundesamt für Bevölkerungsschutz
und Katastrophenhilfe; BBK) under the German Interior Ministry
(BMI), which is the highest federal authority. The main purpose of
the BBK is to prepare the public for times of crisis; coordinate all the
bodies involved before, during, and after a crisis; and provide the
physical and psychological support necessary for citizens’ well-being
(Bundesamt für Bevölkerungsschutz und Katastrophenhilfe [BBK],
2018a, 2018b). Municipalities are active in civil defense (Zivilschutz- und
Katastrophenhilfegesetz, 1997/2009, para. 5/1), and they use information available on the BBK website. Additionally, a host of voluntary
organizations is actively involved in communicating information to
the public.
This is not the case in Cyprus, where for one to be a volunteer, one
must be a citizen of the Republic of Cyprus and register by submitting
an online form. Strategic policy decisions are made by the General Civil
Defense Administration, while there are also five district administrations (Cyprus Ministry of the Interior, 2018a). The Civil Defense Force
has the added responsibility to protect citizens in periods of hostilities
(Cyprus Ministry of the Interior, 2018b).
Which Hazards Are Communicated, and to What Extent Is
the Focus on Prevention?

Greece, Estonia, Cyprus, and France focus on various known risks
and hazards—such as earthquakes; inclement weather; landslides; and
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) threats—with
a focus on those threats specific to each country. For example, Greece
places a particular emphasis on forest fires, which occur annually and
to a certain extent are due to either human error or arson, but there is
no mention of the threat of terrorist attack or hostilities. The current
geopolitical alignment of Greece and its self-reference as an interstice
between East and West may exclude the imaginary of a space for terrorist attacks of the kind similar to those elsewhere in Europe. However,
emphasis is put on home fires as, due to the economic crisis, people
have started using braziers and burning various materials in their
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fireplaces. There is a marked focus on prevention of these well-defined
risks (General Secretariat for Civil Protection, 2018).
In Estonia in 2016, a spatial analysis of home fires showed a correlation with socioeconomic factors. In Tallinn, for example, home fires
occur more often in residential buildings from the Soviet era, where
inhabitants in general are older, have lower income, and live alone
and where Estonian is not their first language. In a departure from the
other countries under comparison in this study, the Estonian Rescue
Board conducts home visits during which they advise residents on
how to make their home safer. In 2016, the board carried out more
than 17,000 home consultations, covering 2.7% of Estonian households. It also organizes safety awareness days and regular school visits
(Päästeamet, 2017).
France covers a broader array of risks with a number of sectoral
plans (national and territorial), each corresponding to a previously
identified risk or threat. A set of complementary plans, Plan Vigipirate
(the Pirate Family), specifically addresses the capacity of the state and
relevant stakeholders to deal with terrorist attacks (Gouvernement Français, 2018b). At the national website, there is a specific section on risk
prevention (Gourvernment Français, 2018c). Under the slogan “Better
prepared, better informed, you will be able to act in case of problems
and help your loved ones in the face of an emergency,” video tutorials
address a number of risks. The Ministry of Interior Affairs’s website
contains a section about personal security (“Ma sécurité”) where citizens
can learn how to avoid accidents inside and outside the home with a
special section for the elderly (French Ministry of the Interior, 2018).
The Civil Defense Force in Cyprus takes up the same risks as Greece
with additional information on what to do in the event of hostile action (the Greek word ehthropraxía [εχθροπραξία] conveys “act of war”
rather than “terrorist attack”), including the case of a bombing campaign by another nation and fires caused by such action. The message
is unequivocal: “Self-protection is basically the responsibility of all of
us. Take the necessary measures in good time” (Civil Defense Force,
2002, n.p.).
While this quote stems from the threat of invasion in Cyprus, the
Greater Manchester Local Resilience Forum has a similar message on
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its website: “Whilst we can’t prevent emergencies happening, we can
plan ahead to minimise the impact” (Greater Manchester Prepared,
2018, n.p.), admitting that the state is unable to keep the citizenry safe
through prevention measures and that safety is the responsibility of
the individual. In addition to England, risk communication strategies
in Sweden and Germany are characterized by an all-hazards approach
that focuses on consequences and the open admission that risks cannot be prevented.
Both Sweden and Germany have incorporated preparedness campaigns in their risk communication strategies, in which the public is
urged to have a store of supplies at hand to survive a certain period of
time during which a complete disruption of societal functions is imagined, including loss of electricity, water, means of transportation, and
any other amenity that one takes for granted in an advanced Western
democracy. The German BKK’s website recommends storing enough
food and water to survive for at least 2 weeks in the worst-case scenario
(BBK, 2017, p.10), though conflicting guidelines from the Ministry of
the Interior advising 5 days’ worth of water supplies and 10 days’ worth
of food created confusion among the citizens (Bundesministerium des
Innern, für Bau und Heimat, 2016).
In Sweden, to raise public awareness, MSB ran a weeklong campaign on May 8, 2017, titled “Upside Down” (Upp och Ner). This was
the second such MSB-led campaign, and its target group was women
between 45 and 64 years of age. The campaign centered on disruption
in electricity supply and focused on the necessities each household
ought to have to be able to function during a days-long blackout. This
campaign essentially reinforced the earlier message communicated
on the websites of Swedish municipalities and county administrative
boards: “this is what you need to have at home during a crisis” (detta
behöver du ha hemma vid en kris).
In Finland, a very different 72-hour campaign mainly consisted of
meetings between nongovernmental organization (NGO) representatives and the public. The campaign was partly carried out online, but
the main focus was on face-to-face workshops. Apart from the official
72-hour website (http://www.72tuntia.fi/), which is available in Finnish, Swedish, and English, several organizations, for example, Suomen
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Pelastusalan Keskusjärjestö (the Finnish National Rescue Association; SPEK), also distributed printed information about the 72-hour
campaign. Notably, SPEK, which is a national consultancy and service
organization for fire and rescue services responsible for training NGO
workers, has used MSB YouTube videos in their training material in
the Swedish speaking areas of Finland. Whereas the 72-hour campaign
is mainly geared toward the urban population, SPEK also maintains
a project called “Our Safe Village” that is geared toward small-town
preparedness for everyday disruptions and accidents (Suomen Pelastusalan Keskusjärjestö, 2018).
Tap Into Innovation: The Use of Technology in Risk
Communication

With the exception of Cyprus, all countries use YouTube to post TV
spots and educational films. They also use Facebook and Twitter as
information dissemination tools. Sweden, England, France, and Germany have launched smartphone applications varying in scope and
interactivity. For example, the French government describes the aims
of the app (called SAIP) as follows: “It is part of an approach to develop a culture of vigilance and security of our citizens, initiated with
the awareness campaign ‘React in case of terrorist attack’ which gives
practical instructions based on: ‘escape, hide, alert’”(Gouvernement
Français, 2018d, n.p.).
Conversely, the German app NINA aims at informing the public
about current weather situations; national, regional, and local threats;
and, in particular, large-scale emergencies (Großschadenslagen). The
dissemination of local-specific information is limited due to the service
availability (BBK, 2018c).
Know Your Impact

It is unclear whether the countries under comparison know the impact
of their risk communication strategies. Though the institutional actors involved have the mandate to evaluate (e.g., Republic of Greece,
2002), no evaluations of risk communication strategies are available on
governmental websites. Estonia, however, is an exception to this: The
Estonian Rescue Board seeks public feedback to measure satisfaction
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and trust in the board’s operations. Feedback was gathered after rescue
events, home consultations, training sessions, safety days, and construction site inspections (Päästeamet, 2017).
Communicate—to Whom?

Most countries convey some information in English, though the English
version lacks in depth and detail. The “easy language” versions of the
Swedish and German websites are also limited. Where the automated
translation function of Google is used, the results can range from confusing to amusing. At the two sides of the continuum are Greece, with
information in six professionally translated languages, and Cyprus and
England, with information only in Greek and English, respectively.
The image of society that comes across by the risk communication
content and techniques is fairly traditional in terms of family structures,
households, and people. For example, images of people with obvious
disabilities are few and far between.
Generally speaking, spatial images are generic, though the environment is implicitly urban. This is deduced not by what is said but rather
by what is left unsaid. For example, there is no information specific to
the countryside. Exceptions to these are the “Safe Village” campaign
in Finland and the information from the English Local Resilience
Forums, because the latter are very localized and the information fits
the local context.
Communicate—for What Purpose, and What Is the Role of
the Recipient?

All eight EU countries, to various degrees, advise the public on how to
prepare, act, and protect themselves and others during events ranging
from inclement weather to acts of war by providing specific information
on these risks. We did not find any instances of explicitly interactive
communication. Even in countries in which there exist smartphone
apps, the information seems to be flowing one way. Having said this,
the content of information seems to activate the recipients: They are
urged to have a family contingency plan, to actively protect their homes
from fires, and to be vigilant and inform if they see suspicious objects
left unattended in public spaces.

222

petridou, danielsson, olofsson, et al.

As mentioned elsewhere in this article, Sweden and, to a certain
extent, Germany have incorporated a specific kind of campaign in their
risk communication strategies, a campaign focused on consequences
rather than risks that urges the public to have supplies to last them
for some time in case of complete societal breakdown due to a mostly
unspecified—and largely irrelevant to the substance of the communication—risk. Sweden alone is sending this information in print form
to all the households in the country.
This focus on the consequences of an unspecified catastrophic event
has had the unforeseen effect of commodifying risk in Sweden. The
emphasis on materiality has created a marketplace for the products
that the state recommends be in every household storage space, such
as canned water.
We argue that this is a case of the citizen being nudged into a perceived resilient state by the admission of the public sector that it will be
unavailable at the onset of an unspecified extreme event. Additionally,
this is a rather static idea of resilience, as the focus is on the materiality
of preparedness rather than social relations and making sure that one’s
neighbor is safe as well. This discourse echoes the U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), which shifts the responsibility of
emergency management from the federal to the state, local, community,
and individual levels (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2018).
Conclusions and Suggestions for Further Research

The eight countries under comparison cover the gamut of geographies
and administrative systems. Moreover, two pairs of countries—Greece
and Cyprus and, to a certain extent, Finland and Sweden—share a
common language and the culture and heritage that are embedded in
language. One would expect similarities in the way the imaginary of
emergencies is reflected in the risk communication policies of Greece
and Cyprus, both part of the European South but with different administrative systems, but that is not the case. Finland runs a campaign with
the same title as Sweden’s, shares the same message, and uses material
from MSB in their information tool kit in the Swedish-speaking parts
of the country. However, the focus is on training volunteer personnel
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and not blanket information dissemination to the public. There are
also two countries that share a (post)colonial relationship—the United
Kingdom and Cyprus. While the United Kingdom and Cyprus share
the same administrative system to some extent, a vestige from an earlier
colonial relationship, Cyprus is alone in the degree of militarization
of civil defense, and the United Kingdom is the foremost country arranging its risk communication structure under the term resilience.
The factor overriding a common heritage (with Greece) or a common
administrative system (with the United Kingdom) is previous experience with an extraordinary event, and Cyprus has had a very recent
experience of military action.
The pattern of institutional structures that organizes risk communication in all the countries under investigation aligns with their
administrative systems. The institution that deals with risk communication is a variation of a civil protection entity normally under the
ministry of the interior, though in the United Kingdom, the central
institution is in the Cabinet Office. Incidentally, this is the equivalent
of the Swedish Prime Minister’s Office, where the Secretariat for Crisis
Management was placed when it was first created in Sweden in 2007
(Petridou & Sparf, 2017). Sweden and the United Kingdom use the
term civil contingencies, whereas Finland, Cyprus, and Estonia use the
term civil defense. The remaining countries use civil protection. There
is a marked military component in the Cypriot structure, but perhaps
this is unsurprising given that its capital is the only remaining divided
capital in the world. There are military echoes in Finland and Estonia
as well, which is again perhaps unsurprising given their historical
contingencies and recent geopolitical events.
The pattern of central control with decentralized input holds more or
less in all countries, including the federal Germany. The U.K. system is
very different, however, where the central level has only strategic functions and all the risk communication competencies have been devolved
to the regional level in what are called Local Resilience Forums. This
makes for a lack of uniformity in information that is communicated to
the public, as each resilience forum is region specific. At the same time,
the public receives information relevant to them and not a generic version of risk communication. In the other countries under comparison,
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information is reproduced at the subnational level from the national
website, which can make for a “one-size-fits-all” information packet
missing local nuances, such as center–periphery issues. In France,
there is a marked fragmentation of information disseminated to the
public with several ministries being involved in the process. Notably,
this fragmentation is at the national level, as the responsibility for
risk communication rests with the national government. Conversely,
in Greece, for example, the Civil Contingencies Secretariat informs
citizens of risks, including risks that are corollaries of adverse weather,
whereas in France, the Ministry of Ecological and Solidarity Transition
informs on these risks.
Volunteer organizations are present in all the countries in question,
though not to the same degree. This ranges from a controlled registration system in Cyprus to very active involvement in Finland to a separate
volunteer organization coordination entity in the United Kingdom.
Other than Germany and Finland, in which volunteer organizations
provide risk communication, in most of the countries in question,
the communication is handled by government at various levels. For
example, in Germany, crisis management rests heavily on the engagement of volunteers in local organizations such as fire brigades and
rescue services. These local organizations communicate information
about risks related to their area of responsibility (e.g., fire) and how to
become a member and participate in crisis management.
Websites are the foremost vehicle for communicating information to
the public, though in Sweden, France, England, and Germany (notably,
in the more economically developed Northern and Western Europe), the
national government also employs apps as early warning systems. The
authorities also use social media to disseminate information: Facebook,
Twitter, and YouTube, though the extent varies among the countries
under comparison. In Estonia, the public sector conducts home visits
to disseminate self-protection guidelines, a possible vestige of an era
of an omnipresent state. The range of state involvement in the amount
and scope of information communicated is quite broad, ranging from
the aforementioned home visits to rather sparse information from the
Civil Defense Force in Cyprus, where the only videos found on YouTube
were recordings of military parades.
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Notably, the strategic risk communication policy gaze of the United
Kingdom and Sweden seems to be fixed westward toward the United
States in terms of devolution and a responsibilitization of the individual,
respectively. Especially in Sweden, though the state is a salient actor in
risk communication through the dissemination of information at the
agency level, the state retreats while nudging at the resilient citizen,
urging him or her to take control of his or her own crisis management.
Finally, the comparison revealed that though there are similarities
in the way the imaginary of emergencies (Calhoun, 2008) is reflected
in risk communication policies in EU countries, there are also major
differences. With the exception of governance arrangements, which
follow each country’s administrative system, we did not find stable
patterns connecting political administrative systems and geography to
the risk communication policy of all the countries under consideration.
The study, however, allowed us to tease out and showcase factors of
risk communication policy by comparing and contrasting across eight
European contexts.
Having said this, we argue that more knowledge is needed regarding
the effects of campaigns and risk communication activities directed
toward the various publics, both in terms of these publics’ understanding, knowledge, and preparedness and in terms of possible differences
between their diverse resources to respond. Furthermore, there is a
need for better understanding of the motives behind the various approaches that different countries apply. Our European comparison shed
some light on the national-level processes, but more cross-country
comparisons within Europe and beyond are needed to position our
results in a global context. In addition to breadth, we also advocate
depth. There is a need for comparative field research and interviews
with the institutional actors and publics involved in the communication
process to understand the construction of the imaginary of emergencies in different national contexts. Finally, it would be beneficial for
researchers and policy makers alike to understand the diffusion of risk
communication policies and the national environments that ideationally influence the policy process.
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ABSTRACT
This study examines stigma from the perspective of residents of Fukushima prefecture following
the 2011 nuclear disaster in Fukushima, Japan, to better understand effective crisis communication strategies that can mitigate the negative effects of self-stigma and promote sustainable
psychosocial recovery. Social cognitive theory was employed to explore cognitive, affective, and
behavioral changes faced by Fukushima residents in response to the stigma imposed upon them
after the disaster. The study result based on in-depth interviews with residents of Shinchimachi,
Fukushima, indicates that affectively, participants experienced a remarkable amount of fear and
sadness. Cognitively, they focused on concerns about outsiders’ negative images or misinformation about Fukushima, changed priorities or values, and self-efficacy. Behaviorally, they actively
resisted the stigma while strengthening their connections and belonging to their own community.
Additionally, residents felt that they were branded as polluted and contagious and attributed the
creation of a Fukushima stigma to a lack of full and accurate information as well as mistrust in main
information sources, including media and government. This research suggests that developing a
more transparent and locally based communication and information system could mitigate the
negative effects of self-stigma. Theoretical implications for future research and policy suggestions
for crisis communications are discussed.
KEYWORDS: Great East Japan Earthquake; Fukushima; social cognitive theory; stigma; risk;
crisis; communication; media

This research explores perceived stigma of residents in a village in
Fukushima, Japan, 5 years after the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake,
tsunami, and nuclear disaster. The tsunami left 15,890 confirmed deaths
and a reported 5,000 to 8,000 people missing (Dunbar, McCullough,
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A candle inside of bamboo reads 元気でがんばってます安らかに
(I am fine and living my life to the fullest. So rest in peace) at an annual memorial
in Shinchimachi for victims of the March 2011 disaster (Kwesell, 2013).
FIGURE 1

Mungov, Varner, & Stroker, 2011; Johnson, 2011; Figure 1).1 The physical
catastrophe—earthquake, tsunami, and radioactive nuclides being released from the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant—overwhelmed
Northeast Japan (Blandford & Ahn, 2012; Maeda & Oe, 2015). Radiation
prolonged public health concerns and damaged Fukushima’s fishing
and agriculture economy (Maeda & Oe, 2015). The ongoing disaster
extended beyond the physical needs of immediate cleanup, planned
reconstruction, and public health prevention processes. Communication breakdowns between the government, the power plant, and mass
media caused panic (Maeda & Oe, 2015), while rumors and framed
media stories changed the social environment both within and outside
of Japan (Ben-Ezra et al., 2015). Bromet (2011) suggested that examining
both mental and physical destruction following the nuclear disaster will
allow insight into long-term recovery for future disasters.
Fukushima was viewed as radiated, and the land and people within
faced stigma (Ben-Ezra et al., 2015). According to a 2012 survey conducted in temporary housing units for tsunami and radiation refugees,
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A mother stands in front of her “temporary home” holding her youngest child. The family was displaced from nuclear radiation, and they lived in
Shinchimachi’s temporary housing for 4 years (Kwesell, 2012).
FIGURE 2

people felt branded as polluted (汚染された) from a prefecture of radiation
(放射能の県; Kwesell, 2013, 2018). While some studies have examined
types of stigmas imposed on residents of Fukushima (Maeda & Oe,
2015; Shigemura, Tanigawa, Saito, & Nomura, 2012), few have focused
on how the residents perceived the stigmas imposed on them. Examining perceived stigma and self-stigma of people affected by Japan’s
disaster provides an opportunity to better understand the impacts of
mass media and interpersonal communication in crisis communication. Reducing miscommunication, confusion, and a media-produced
public stigma might lower self-stigma and the long-term negative psychosocial effects that follow (Maeda & Oe, 2017). Crisis management
relies on dissemination of accurate information. In Japan’s case, the
government and mass media’s failure to inform led to confusion and
mistrust, a situation that outlasted the initial disaster (Friedman, 2011).
This research explores perceptions, feelings, thoughts, and behaviors about stigma by Fukushima residents living in proximity to the
power plant, including self-derogation, ideas about contamination and
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contagion, efficacy, stigma resistance, and the origins of the Fukushima
stigma, to better understand psychosocial responses and suggest future
crisis communication strategies.
The study site is Shinchimachi, a coastal fishing and agriculture
village located in the northeastern corner of Fukushima, 50 km north
of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant. One hundred nine residents out of its 8,030 population died in the tsunami, and many people
lost their homes (Shinchi Town, n.d.-a). Some residents left the village
after the nuclear explosions, and radiation refugees were relocated
there. Figure 2 documents a family who lived in temporary housing
in Shinchimachi. While recovery is under way, people still suffer from
the fear of the unknown risk of living in Shinchimachi and from the
stigma attached to being residents of Fukushima.
Literature Review
Conceptualizing Stigma

Stigma is born when one or more groups label another group with
an imagined or invented negative attribute, and as it becomes more
well known, it merges into a commonly understood stereotype (Puhl,
Schwartz, & Brownell, 2005). Communication naturally spreads the
stereotype, and the collective consciousness of one group diverges into
two: the group or groups who assign the attribute (the stigmatizing)
become self-defined as normal, and the group to whom the attribute is
assigned (the stigmatized) becomes defined as abnormal (Durkheim,
1933). To Link and Phelan (2001), the creation of a stigma is reliant
on a co-occurrence of several components (e.g., labeling, stereotyping, separation, status loss, and discrimination) yet only exists when
structural power is exercised through government, higher social classes,
and media, among others. Mass media’s framed stories amplify events
and perpetuate ideologies (Gamson & Modigliani, 1989), and the media acts as a “power holder” controlling limited information sources
(Ball-Rokeach & De Fleur, 1975; Slovic et al., 1991). The perceptions
that are spread become inherent defining characteristics of the group,
and what was imagined and created become what is perceived as real
(Link & Phelan, 2001).
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Though stigma is socially created, over time, even the self-understanding of those who are stigmatized begins to shift. According to
Corrigan and Watson (2002), self-stigmatization occurs when people
begin to feel the same way as they are described by the stigma, such
that “they accept the discredited status as valid” (Steward et al., 2008,
p. 3). Self-stigmatization can result in anger, loss of self-esteem, and
even a weakening of community resilience (Corrigan, Watson, & Barr,
2006). For example, HIV stigma left people with concerns about disclosure, a negative self-image, worries about the public’s attitude, lower
self-esteem, and depression (Berger, Ferrans, & Lashley, 2001; Riggs,
Vosvick, & Stallings, 2007).
Bromet (2011) suggested that in Japan, the limited yet ominous
historical references to nuclear disaster are inaccurate, confusing, and
contradictory, and they connect Fukushima to Hiroshima and Nagasaki. This historical reference inflates already existing fears of nuclear
disaster and radioactive nuclide exposure. Historically, atomic bomb
survivors in Japan were dehumanized as “other” and contagious (Lifton,
1987), and they continue to face shame, guilt, and alienation (Ishikawa,
1981). Bromet (2011) suggested that the connection to the past is intractable and that mental health effects in Fukushima will thus be lasting.
Social Cognitive Theory: Affective, Cognitive, and
Behavioral Dimensions

Bandura’s (1986) social cognitive theory (SCT) suggests that humans act
based on their ability to decode what they have vicariously learned. The
essence of humanness and society is based on the idea that “cognitive,
affective and biological events, behavioral patterns, and environmental events all operate as interacting determinants that influence each
other” (Bandura, 2001b, p. 266). Affective dimensions of stigma have
been measured in attributes of fear/anxiety, embarrassment, shame or
guilt, sadness/depression, shock, irritation or anger, personalization
and internalization, and feelings of community belonging (Berger,
1995; Bresnahan & Zhuang, 2016). Cognitive dimensions have been
measured in rejection concerns, disclosure concerns, changed priorities or values such as mentally coping, concerns about outsiders’ negative perceptions, internal stigma thoughts and overwhelming ideas,
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indifference, self- and collective efficacy, and empowerment (Berger,
1995; Berger et al., 2001; McCombs & Shaw, 1972; Ritsher, Otilingam, &
Grajales, 2003). Behavioral dimensions have been measured in social
withdrawal, concealing, resisting stigma, seeking or not seeking help,
avoiding travel, participating in or experiencing community connections or civic participation, and either witnessing stigma firsthand or
hearing about it secondhand from a local person who had witnessed
it (Fitzpatrick, 2008; Ritsher et al., 2003).
Vicarious learning: Sources of stigma formation in nuclear crisis. One proposition of SCT is that individuals’ identity formation is

based on vicarious learning. Individuals learn from interacting, by
being part of social groups, and from mass media (Bandura, 1986). In
cases of nuclear disaster, vicarious learning becomes more prominent
due to the invisible potential danger of radiation as well as a lack of
information (Cleary & Houts, 1984). Self-stigmatization via vicarious
learning can be formed interpersonally (personal contacts, word of
mouth, gossip; Kaiser, 2006), structurally (community norms and
institutional policies; Hatzenbuehler, 2014), and through mass media
(Slovic et al., 1991).
Gossip can spread conflicting narratives and cause panic (Stadler,
2003), even leading to unsuccessful public health initiatives (Pop, 2016).
Socol (2015) suggested that though the Chernobyl nuclear disaster
resulted in a low number of radioactive-specific physical ailments,
evacuees faced heightened anxiety and increased suicide from “myths
about the threat of radiation” (p. 8). Rumors spread fears about birth
defects, deaths, and cancers even in neighboring countries (Entman,
1993; Gamson & Modigliani, 1989), and anxiety remained 6–20 years
after the disaster (Bromet & Havenaar, 2007). In a study about the
2003 SARS outbreak, Person and colleagues (2004) found that Internet
rumors spread inaccurate information and led to fear and apprehensiveness about admitting to illness or seeking treatment. Shigemura
and colleagues (2015) suggested that the negative effects of rumors in
Fukushima could be mitigated by congruent public health information.
Structural stigma includes discriminatory social policies and community-level attitudes (Hatzenbuehler, 2014), segregated locations
for care (Link & Phelan, 2006), and a lack of available social services
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(Liegghio, 2017). Hatzenbuehler (2014) found that discriminating social
policies influence community attitudes and escalate mental health issues, leading to higher rates of mortality and cardiovascular disease.
Schizophrenia treatment centers were found placed in impoverished
and unsafe areas (Link & Phelan, 2006). Caregivers for youth with
mental illness voiced struggles with social services’ fragmentation,
including education systems, child protective services, and criminal
justice (Liegghio, 2017).
Mass media’s powerful role is a central pillar to the creation of stigma
(Bandura, 2001a). In the 1980 Mt. St. Helens disaster, mass media was
the first-sought information source to resolve ambiguity during crisis
(Hirschburg, Dillman, & Ball-Rokeach, 1986). Media’s framing determines the way in which the public views a crisis and can alter the sense
of self that survivors experience (Coombs, 2007). Perko (2011) suggested
that the media in Fukushima should have addressed the specific hazard, immediate emergency instructions, and postdisaster instructions
to mitigate negative outcomes, yet stories were embellished because
reporters and editors had to fill budget lines and expand readership.
Research Questions

Based on SCT and prior literature, this study proposes the following
two research questions:
RQ1: How are affective, cognitive, and behavioral dimensions proposed by social cognitive theory reflected in Shinchimachi residents’
perceptions of stigma?
RQ2: What interpersonal, media, and governmental sources are likely
to have influenced Shinchimachi residents’ perceptions of stigma?

Research Method
Research Procedure and Participants

This research is based on 12 in-depth interviews with residents of
Shinchimachi. Participants were found through snowball sampling.
All were directly affected by the earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear
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fallout. Eight were tsunami refugees who lived in temporary housing for 4 years, and one was a radiation refugee evacuated from her
home to Shinchimachi. Their ages ranged from 24 to 80 years, with
an average age of 59 years, which reflects the aging society of Shinchimachi, where the average age of residents is 48 years old (Shinchi
Town, n.d.-b).
Interview questions were created in English and then translated into
Japanese by a bilingual native Japanese speaker and linguistics professor. Particular attention was paid to avoiding directly asking sensitive
or painful questions about experiences during and after the disaster.
Interviews were conducted in Japanese, transcribed, and then translated
into English by a team of five bilingual native Japanese translators and
rechecked by the two most experienced translators. Each interview
lasted between 50 and 120 minutes.
Around the eighth interview, answers started to become redundant.
Instead of claiming saturation, the interviewers employed grounded
theory research suggestions by Charmaz (2006) and Corbin and Strauss
(2008), who recommended that after saturation is found, interviews go
more in depth to unearth nuances that bring about new data. Thus the
researchers began to ask more detailed questions, furthered clarifications, and allowed more time for new data to emerge in finer points.
Interview Questions and Data Analysis

Interview themes and questions were derived from the literature review.
Examples of questions include the following:
•
•
•

How do you think Fukushima people’s lives changed after 3.11
(March 11, 2011)?
Did you feel differently after 3.11 because you are from Fukushima? If yes, how?
How do you think Fukushima was represented in the news
right after 3.11?

Data analysis was based on both theoretical and grounded approaches.
An overall framework of affective, cognitive, and behavioral dimensions
based on SCT (Bandura, 1986) was set a priori. However, establishing
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an a priori coding scheme was not feasible because of the insufficient
number of past studies concerning perceived stigma and communication in crisis settings, especially following a nuclear disaster. A two-stage
coding process based on a grounded approach was thus employed.
First, the authors engaged in a thematic analysis of the data, deriving
subthemes within each of the affective, cognitive, and behavioral dimensions. To ensure the validity of the subthemes, two graduate students
were hired to revisit the data by coding available themes derived by the
authors. The coders and the authors had several meetings to resolve
disagreements, and the subthemes were updated with a clearer operationalization of concepts.
Results
Affective, Cognitive, and Behavioral Dimensions of
Perceived Stigma (RQ1)

With regard to the categorization of participants’ perceptions of stigma,
certain prominent themes arose. Affectively, participants discussed experiencing a remarkable amount of fear and sadness. Cognitively, they
focused on concerns about outsiders’ negative images or misinformation about Fukushima, changed priorities or values, and self-efficacy.
Behaviorally, participants expressed actively resisting stigma, having
increased community connections, and experiencing or hearing about
enacted stigma.
Affective. The affective dimensions derived from prior theory were
all mentioned, except for embarrassment and shock. The most outstanding affective dimension was fear/anxiety. Every participant expressed
fear, with the subject mentioned on 48 different occasions. Seven participants expressed fear for the health and future of children, while
fear about children eating local food or drinking water, playing in the
soil, or swimming in the ocean, and fears for their future, were widely
acknowledged. Figure 3 illustrates a summer festival where children
cannot help but get muddy. One father expressed,
Even if we the adults ate it, I didn’t want to feed the children those
crops. . . . I had anxiety. Anxiety for the future of my children. My
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Children play water games on a rainy day during Shinchimachi’s summer
festival, which attracts residents of villages along the Fukushima coastline. Before
the festival, the park had its top layer of grass and dirt removed in an attempt to
lower the ground radiation (Kwesell, 2013).
FIGURE 3

children also got the checkups but I am always worried, what if that
result was not accurate?

Seven participants specifically mentioned fear/anxiety about food
safety. Responses covered damaged industry, for example, one participant shared that “for the fishermen and vegetable shop owners.
They may not be able to sell their goods.” The apple farmer said that
he considered leaving Fukushima to start over because people would
assume that because he was in Fukushima, his apples would have high
levels of radiation. Even if he checked and they did not, people might
not trust their safety. Many participants decided to check radiation
levels for food they had personally grown at the town hall.
In addition to fear/anxiety about children and food was a general fear
of invisible, unknown aspects of radiation. One 80-year-old participant
said, “I am a farmer and radiation is something that can’t be seen.” Participants expressed a continued fear stemming from a general feeling
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A child plays with a radiation counter in Shinchimachi’s largest park.
Public parks, open areas, and school playgrounds all have radiation counters after
the nuclear disaster (Kwesell, 2012).
FIGURE 4

of “uncertainty” and this led to felt ailments or somatic symptoms. As
demonstrated in Figure 4, they are constantly reminded of the higher
levels of radiation as the village is dotted with radiation counters. One
participant mentioned, “I don’t know. About the radiation. About the
nuclear disaster. When I feel a little ill, my mind immediately goes on
thinking that it is because of radiation.”
The second most often mentioned affective dimension was sadness/
depression, which was mentioned by 8 participants a total of 20 times by
expressing sadness, depression, or a feeling of separation and rejection.
Participants said, “So sad that we have come to such a level” and “I was
hurt just hearing about it.” One radiation evacuee said that her family all
used to live together yet are now split across four places in three different prefectures. For her, depression lasted about 1–2 years, and sadness
stemmed from a mixture of feeling alone and seeing negative Internet
comments, which she characterized as “painful.” One grandmother
expressed a deep sadness of “rejection” when her children stopped
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accepting homegrown food she sent. Sadness also stemmed from the
very dichotomy of living in a place surrounded by nature yet fearing
it. Another participant shared, “[My children] have never gone to the
sea. They pass by it in the car but haven’t gone to the beach. We live
in a place where the nature surrounds us—both the mountain and the
sea. But it is so sad they can’t go to the ocean.” A few participants also
expressed anger about outsiders’ views of Fukushima, yet, despite the
many difficult affective responses elicited from interviews, feelings of
community support were also expressed. One participant noted that he
felt a sense of peace: “because I have all my family and friends and the
community, I am okay.”
Cognitive. All of the cognitive dimensions discussed in literature were mentioned by participants, while the most outstanding was
concerns about outsiders’ negative image or misinformation about Fukushima, expressed by all participants a total of 73 times. They communicated that everything related to Fukushima after the nuclear accident is now grouped together into one long-lasting negative image.
One participant said that the first impression is “engraved in people’s
minds” and will thus “continue.” They expressed being disliked and
avoided, and one noted that tourists no longer want to visit the prefecture. The Fukushima stigma was expressed as a misunderstanding.
One participant shared, “It’s almost as though people think you get
cancer from just hearing the term Fukushima.” Eight people thought
that others might think it is hard for Fukushima women to get married or have healthy children. In addition, respondents mentioned the
historical reference from the aftermath of the atomic bombing and
people’s resulting negative attitudes toward women, marriage, and the
ability to bear healthy children.
Eight people mentioned that others assume Fukushima prefecture
and its people, objects, and food are contagious. Some reported their
cars being vandalized, while others were asked if their cars were contagious. Two participants shared that Fukushima children who went
to school in another prefecture after the disaster were called “dirty.”
The second most often mentioned cognitive dimension was changed
priorities and values. Ten participants expressed such changes a total
of 33 times. One participant noted,
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When I was doing dead body searches and finding bodies every day . . .
I felt, there is a reason that I am alive today. I need to do something for
the community . . . living with a purpose. . . . So before, my priority was
the business, but now . . . I want to contribute to making Shinchimachi
a better place for all.

Others expressed that family time and bonding had become essential priorities. One participant noted, “Now, if we can go through
a day peacefully, then I am happy. If I can spend a good time with my
grandchildren, I am happy. . . . I just want to live peacefully with my
husband.”
Nine participants expressed self-efficacy and six expressed collective
efficacy. The apple farmer is now experimenting with a new technique to
grow tastier apples more efficiently. Before the disaster, he did not have
much of a plan to expand, and for 2 years after, he felt overwhelmed
and stuck. Then he slowly regained footing and started having new
ideas and dreams. Several participants expressed future thinking by
continually thinking about participating in rebuilding the village. Participants experienced a desire to support one another, join together to
fight against stigma, and share a fuller story of Fukushima, illustrating
that residents continue “carrying on with their li[ves].” In addition, they
spoke about a desire to share what they called a real or more inclusive
story of Fukushima rather than the partial or negative story shared by
the mass media. One participant noted, “So although we are victims, we
still have power and energy to do something more for the community.
Not just asking for help from outside but helping ourselves.”
Behavioral. The most outstanding behavioral dimension was actively resisting stigma, expressed by all participants on 19 occasions.
Eight mentioned verbally claiming they are from Fukushima as “honest
fact.” One said, “I would say that I am from Fukushima with confidence
and pride.” Another shared, “I was born here and there is nothing to
hide from it.” Four participants mentioned actively working to change
Fukushima’s negative image and experiencing some frustrations doing
so. One shared, “This part of Fukushima, radiation levels only reached
to this level, so it is not a problem. Although we try to spread this fact
ourselves, it seems that the public is unwilling to accept.”
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The second most salient behavioral dimension was community
support and involvement, mentioned by 8 participants, and witnessing
enacted stigma, mentioned by 11. One participant said her husband
postponed his retirement as the community needed electricians. The
apple farmer noted that while he lost outside clients, his community
kept buying apples. One business owner transformed his life by starting
a nonprofit organization that supports victims of the disaster, children,
and elders in the community.
Eleven participants had either witnessed enacted stigma directly
or heard about it happening both outside and within the prefecture.
One participant shared, “Children get bullied at school for being from
Fukushima . . . even within Fukushima.” Cars were mentioned being
damaged, “wretched and scratched because they had a Fukushima
number plate.” People who fled their homes were shown that they were
unwelcome in the new place. One participant shared, “Even within
Fukushima, when a family moved to Iwaki from the evacuation area
and went around to greet their new neighbors, gifts that they had
given were returned to their doorstep the next day because of where
they were from.”
Participants also expressed social withdrawal and concealing being
from Fukushima. Family friendships were broken and contact lost with
people who fled Fukushima, and one person mentioned that she had
stopped sending gifts to family outside because the gifts did not feel
welcome. One said that it was too exhausting to tell foreigners where
he was from: “When I go abroad I say I am from Sendai, Japan. I went
to America, China, a lot of places, but never say Fukushima because
people will react to Fukushima—even foreigners.”
Perceived Sources of Stigma (RQ2)

With regard to perceived sources of stigma, all research participants
mentioned the media in general terms, and some mentioned specific forms of media, such as television, Internet, and newspapers. In
addition, they mentioned the Japanese government, Tokyo Electric
Power Company (TEPCO), and interpersonal contacts/rumors as
sources.
The most dominant perceived source of stigma mentioned was the
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general term media by all participants 70 times, while most did not
report the kind of media. They expressed that the media did not show
the full story, mistold the story, or lied. The media was criticized for
deceiving and for lacking information. One participant claimed to “only
believe what I see with my own eyes.”
Three participants suggested that the media only shares choice
elements to create “tears” or “entertain.” Two specifically mentioned
that a story is written and published despite fact-based knowledge.
To one participant, the media’s portrayals bring mistrust: “When I see
such newspapers and magazines, the first thing I feel is anger. I can’t
trust these.”
Television, newspaper, and online sources. Six participants mentioned television as a specific source of stigma. One spoke of reports of
victims of the 2016 Kumamoto, Japan, earthquake refusing donations
from Fukushima: “There are some who would accept, but even now,
there are some people who see us like that. I learned that from watching the TV.” Four participants mentioned newspapers (either online or
offline) as a source of stigma. One said that a local newspaper reported
only on radiation fallout and failed cleanup attempts: “They only say
negative things. I wish that they would say more about what should be
done construction-wise or portray it in a way that makes us more hopeful.” Three participants specifically blamed online sources for contagion
rumor. One participant noted, “I have seen on the Internet and media,
things like radiation is contagious so you shouldn’t go near them.”
Government and TEPCO. Seven participants mentioned the Japanese government as a source of stigma, and four mentioned TEPCO.
One mentioned that people only accept news as fact and that news
comes from sources of structural power. One said that he “feels foolish” for believing the government and TEPCO. The media’s immediate
disaster report put one participant’s family in danger: “We fled to Shirakawa. But in reality, it turned out that the radiation level was higher
than that of Shinchimachi. We lacked information back then.”
Interpersonal contacts and rumors. Five participants mentioned
the cause of stigma to be interpersonal contacts and rumors. They noted
that while the media created and shared the story, influences lay equally
in the minds of media audiences and the meanings they derived:
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I don’t think it’s the media’s fault. . . . I think people exaggerated how
they processed the information, automatically making things worse in
their heads—that the condition of the nuclear reactors is worse than
what is told, that all of Fukushima is now not functioning, that every
part of Fukushima has been contaminated.

Participants seemed to differentiate between physical damage by
the earthquake, tsunami, or forced evacuation and damage created by
rumors, which “hurt in nonvisible ways. . . . Most people, they take in
the information just as it is delivered. That leads to rumors and stereotypes.” In addition, some participants mentioned the feeling that the
rest of Japan had them under a microscope, as if they were interested
in the lives of Fukushima people “like rats in a science experiment.”
Overall, participants expressed wanting more transparency: for the
media, government, and TEPCO to share truth and for news not to
be swayed in an overly positive or negative way. They wanted victims’
personal stories shared as well as facts that could offer them a chance
to make their own informed decisions about safety.
Discussion
Summary and Implications of the Results

The stigma perceived by the participants in Shinchimachi reveals their
newly emerged identity in relation to the rest of Japan as a prefecture
of radiation. Affectively, they felt anxious and sad about the new circumstances that suddenly emerged out of their control. Cognitively,
they were highly concerned about negative views about Fukushima
among “outsiders.” Behaviorally, they actively resisted the stigma while
strengthening their connections and belonging to their own community.
One important finding in this study is that while stigma has negative connotations, participants did not all exhibit negative effects from
stigma. Similar to what Goffman (1963) proposed, people think through
stigmas following an initial emotional reaction and experience varying
degrees of efficacy. As noted in several past studies (Link & Phelan,
2001; Southall, Gagné, & Jennings, 2010; Steward et al., 2008), stigma
causes people to rethink values, priorities, goals and dreams and even
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encourages them to become more involved in the conception of a
desired future. Shinchimachi was perceived to be stronger as people
supported one another and actively strengthened ties to resist stigma.
The village’s reputation was likely damaged as a part of Fukushima, and
physical dangers remain ambiguous. Despite this, self- and collective
efficacy were expressed even 5 years after the disaster.
The willingness to resist the Fukushima stigma may enable participants to speak out more actively about needed policy change to keep
them safe both physically and socially. If there were better communication channels through which residents of affected areas could express
their thoughts and feelings within and outside of their communities,
more accurate information could be conveyed and shared. Results
concerning sources of stigma formation offer valuable implications for
people’s dependency on the mass media and interpersonal contacts in
disaster situations. Although the mass media has been previously proven
as the main source of information in ambiguous times (Ball-Rokeach,
1985, 1998; Hirschburg et al., 1986), some participants expressed such
a high level of mistrust in the media that they relied on interpersonal
communication for information. Consistent with the media framing
literature (Entman, 1993; Gamson & Modigliani, 1989; Goffman, 1974),
participants found that stories mostly followed precreated dramatized
frames, from which they felt stigma originated. They mentioned that
journalists arrived on scene with stories that had already been written
and were mostly looking to find quotes to match their angles (Durkheim,
1933; Puhl et al., 2005). Results indicate that people’s dependency on
different types of information sources in disaster situations is likely to
be influenced by their trust in the framing of stories in the mass media.
Future studies can further reveal the relationship between dependency
on media in disaster situations and the effects of framed content.
The most salient stigma attributes expressed were fear and, interestingly, a desire to resist stigma. Past studies have found that the stigmatizers can have fear toward people with a diagnosed ailment (Berger,
1995; Berger et al., 2001). In a different angle, fear and anxiety from the
stigmatized likely stem from lack of information (Rubin, 1987). The
present study offers new data that sheds light on a more illusive sense of
fear. The participants feared their current situation and future because of
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radiation, which they cannot see and the physiological effects of which
they do not fully understand. But they also felt that other people feared
those who were exposed. These fears could not be tangibly defined
because of radiation’s elusive characteristic, and there is no direct situation to which they can be compared. This phenomenon of fears created
by the multifaceted layers of stigma and self-stigma effects builds on
more direct stigma-induced fear research (Zhuang et al., 2016). Based
on Rubin’s (1987) findings, one way to alleviate fear is to offer victims
full information. In the case of future crises, information structures
and dispersal networks could help alleviate fears in unforeseen and
overwhelming situations. The interplay of fear and the resistance of
stigma is worth further exploration.
Suggestions for Future Crisis Communications

We make three suggestions for future crisis communication strategies
based on our findings. Stigma takes place when information is lacking and rumors begin to spread (Flynn, Slovic, & Kunreuther, 2001;
Goffman, 1963). Open and clear communication about risk and public
health issues can mitigate the long-term negative effects of self-stigma
(Maeda & Oe, 2017). First, a multichannel flow of information would
minimize the spread of inaccurate rumors and allow more options for
vicarious learning beyond the mass media–centric story. Special attention would be needed to make information accessible to all individuals
in the at-risk population. In an aging community like Shinchimachi,
many of the elders might not have access to the Internet or use social
media. The present research indicates that interpersonal channels
and the local media play an important role in crisis communication.
Future research can examine effective and accessible means of information dispersal in immediate disaster response and reconstruction
phases engaging all forms of mainstream, local, and social media and
a more structured response including small groups and face-to-face
information dispersal. Many interviewees expressed confusion owing
to a lack of information on the health effects of radiation. Rather than
not communicating information because of an inability to agree on
facts, multiple perspectives about disaster and risks entailed should
be presented so that people can make informed and rational decisions.
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Second, disaster response and communication strategies should
include ways for residents to talk openly about their difficulties, uncertainties, and frustrations. Several interviewees mentioned the frustration of not being able confide in others about what they experienced
due to the stigma and sensitivity of the disaster. In the immediate
aftermath of a disaster, informal group conversation can be carried out
at evacuation shelters with community leaders spreading information
and encouraging open discussion. With respect to a more long-term
aftermath, therapeutic interventions can include more formal discussion groups. This would allow victims to share information in a safe
space, voice anxieties and concerns, and come to some agreement on
strategies moving forward.
Third, crisis communication experts should put immediate focus
on local media and encourage them to take on active roles to overcome
negative effects by mainstream media’s framed stories. Local media
should provide focused information on the local area and publish more
stories and voices from local citizens. Print, television, and radio, in
addition to the Internet, could help disperse information to diverse
groups of people. Local media can offer vital information and likely
lessen the long-term effects of self-stigma.
Limitations and Future Research

The limitations of our study should be mentioned. This qualitative
study focused on understanding stigma from the perspective of crisis
survivors and, thus, did not to attempt to generalize findings to all Fukushima survivors. Findings from this study could help develop scales
for future survey research on stigmatized disaster survivors.
Shinchimachi is an aging community, and new generations often
move to cities for university, while few young people return. The participants’ age range reflected this trend to an extent yet was still too
heavily weighted toward elderly people and would benefit from more
inquiry with younger generations. Future research with a larger capacity
in a wider area of Fukushima prefecture would offer more insight into
the more general stigma perceived by Fukushima residents.
Despite these limitations, this study makes an important contribution to the field of crisis communication by uncovering multiple
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dimensions of stigma perceived by Fukushima residents and how the
residents are coping with the imposed stigma. The study lays a basis
for future research on stigma, disaster, crisis communication, and recovery. The study also suggests that researchers in this field should be
aware of the challenges of accessing the sensitive research population.
Many residents of Fukushima were hesitant to participate in disasterrelated interviews with researchers from outside of Fukushima in
ongoing circumstances of having to cope with psychological trauma
in a stigmatized place and with unknowns of future radiation-related
health issues. These challenges make further research with this type
of population both challenging and valuable.
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Note
1. The first author, Allison Kwesell, is a photojournalist and has been
documenting the lives of the people of Fukushima since 2011. Several of her
photographs are included as figures.
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A corporate crisis shapes the reputation of the corporation affected,
public opinion regarding the corporation, and the economy of the
nation where the crisis occurs (An & Gower, 2009). Media coverage
of a corporate crisis can influence corporations, governments, and
stakeholders to a substantial degree. A crisis is a stage of an event at
which future events can be better or worse. Such future events unfold depending on the causes, attributions, and solutions of the crisis
(Coombs & Holladay, 2004). As such, how the public views a crisis is
an important factor in determining the fate of involved organizations.
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In communication research, an indispensable step toward identifying
the effects of a corporate crisis is to examine how the crisis is framed
in media because how media frame a corporate crisis facilitates or
deteriorates publics’ attitudes and behaviors toward the corporation
(Coombs, 2006; Valentini & Romenti, 2011).
In recent years, media message production and distribution have
transformed in an interactive way (Hindman, 2009). Audiences readily
engage with people by sharing, endorsing, or opposing posts on social
media. Audiences offer opinions on issues in interactive news platforms
(Diehl, Weeks, & Gil de Zúñiga, 2016). Furthermore, as J. Kim, Brossard,
Scheufele, and Xenos (2016) also discussed, the sentiment shared on
social media about a crisis influences how audiences perceive the issue.
Given the increasing impact of social media posts on users regarding
active internalizing (viewing) and externalizing (sharing or retweeting;
Diehl et al., 2016), it is crucial to investigate how message frames relate
to audience sentiment, which can form public opinion.
Crisis information is disseminated faster on social media than
other news channels due to users’ direct posts on sites, virality, and
global reach, which make the crisis’s impact powerful (van der Meer &
Verhoeven, 2013). When a massive earthquake and tsunami caused a
nuclear accident in Japan in 2011, one particular article about the crisis
was the most shared story on Facebook that year (Facebook, 2011). For
this reason, researchers are concerned with how issues, frames, opinions, and sentiment on social media influence public perceptions of
a crisis at an international level (Hajdu, Pápay, Szántó, & Tóth, 2018).
Even though several researchers have focused on social media content
related to crises (e.g., Ceron, 2015; J. Kim et al., 2016) and users’ issuesharing intentions (Khuntia, Sun, & Yim, 2016), scant research has
been conducted on corporate crisis framing and on relating framing
to sentiment in an international context. Hence, using a recent global
corporate crisis as a case, this study seeks to (a) track which frames
frequently occurred in social media posts; (b) explore online sentiment
toward the brand, product, and crisis; and (c) demonstrate the relationship between message frames and audience sentiment.
The current study conducted a social media content analysis of the
Samsung Galaxy Note 7 explosion crisis, which caused serious safety
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concerns (e.g., possible explosion in an airplane that can affect safety)
and public fear (Ferreras, 2016; McGregor, 2016). This crisis received
national and international attention because of the product’s almost
ubiquitous penetration across the world (“Worldwide Smartphone
Sales,” 2016). A global corporate crisis can, however, cause a falsely
assumed universality of the issue if the crisis is examined only in one
nation (Dogan & Pelassy, 1984) because international crisis news has
been known to have ethnocentric biases in terms of both events and
geographic focus (de Vreese, Peter, & Semetko, 2001). However, examining social media posts on a crisis in multiple nations offers a way to
identify how the crisis is framed depending on national backgrounds
(Swanson, 2000). To ensure a comprehensive observation and assessment, this study explores the Samsung crisis by analyzing posts on social
media in three different nations: the United States, Australia, and South
Korea. The three nations are chosen because they represented the highest smartphone penetration rates in the world at the time of the incident
(McPhillips, 2016). South Korea and the United States manufactured
the top three smartphones sold in the world: the Samsung Galaxy S7
(South Korea), the Apple iPhone 7 (United States), and the LG G5
(South Korea; Triggs, 2016). Australia was the nation where Samsung
Galaxy had the largest market share, followed by South Korea (Nino,
2017). Identifying social media post frames and comparing them with
user sentiment in these nations can provide clues for effective public
relations (PR) strategies, corporate reputation recovery, and negative
affect reduction.
Crisis Framing and Cross-National Communication

When a crisis is framed, certain aspects of the crisis are reemphasized
as salient attributes. This slanted coverage affects how audiences perceive, organize, and interpret events and issues (de Vreese et al., 2001;
Entman, 1993). Frames in media refer to the central idea of organizing
and providing meaning to a selection of attributes by selection, presentation, and exclusion (Nelson, Clawson, & Oxley, 1997). In other words,
to frame is to select, organize, and define certain themes and aspects
of reality and to emphasize events, issues, and actors of the agenda
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to make them prominent (Entman, 2004). For example, the Chinese
news media framed recalled Chinese products as “unavoidable” and
“exaggerated Western media,” whereas the U.S. news media framed
them as “worrisome” or from a “broken system” (Hong, 2013, p. 86).
In crisis communication, frames can shape the public’s attribution
of crisis responsibility to organizations, governments, and stakeholders.
Crisis frames can influence the public’s reputation perception, sentiment, behavioral intention toward the organization in crisis, and the
organization’s rebuild strategy (Coombs, 2007). Media play a central
role in this process because the way a crisis is framed can shape the
attributes of the crisis. Media select which issues to report in organizations’ crisis responses, such as cause and responsibility, frames that
influence audience sentiment (Coombs, 2006).
Framing can be labeled on varying levels and applications in the
international context. The levels in framing are generic frames, issuespecific frames, and cross-national frames (de Vreese, 2005). Generic
frames represent a broad range of aspects of a topic in different cultural
contexts (de Vreese et al., 2001; Guo, Holton, & Jeong, 2012) and provide a common analytical framework in terms of strategic aspects of
the agenda (Cappella & Jamieson, 1997). Issue-specific frames, on the
other hand, pertain to detailed categories of an event (de Vreese, 2005)
and present different issues from event to event. Issue-specific frames,
hence, anatomize an event and enable the audience to understand the
event in fine detail. Cross-national frames concern identities embedded in international issue coverage. In the cross-national comparative
framing model, Guo et al. (2012) stated that media coverage is affected
by culture, national identity, and/or politically driven frames. Different
nations may use distinct frames to cover identical issues.
Generic Frames

Generic frames are used in analyses about crises to explain commonly
categorized frames occurring in an agenda (An & Gower, 2009). In
this view, generic frames are defined as frames that are universally
applicable to an agenda. Neuman, Just, and Crigler (1992) categorized
types of frames dominant in the U.S. news media into four categories: conflict, economic consequences, human impact, and morality.
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Semetko and Valkenburg (2000) added attribution of responsibility
to these four frames in accounting for crises. These five news frames
are a generalization of crises, which can be applied to different nations
(de Vreese et al., 2001).
Conflict frames in the media emphasize disagreement among individuals, groups, or organizations in the crisis as a means of capturing
audience interest. An and Gower (2009) found that over 64% of analyzed
news contained conflict frames. For example, U.S. newspapers framed
the Fukushima nuclear power plant crisis as a conflict that could induce audience cynicism (Lazic & Kaigo, 2013). Economic consequence
frames report a crisis event in terms of the impact the crisis will have
economically on individuals, groups, organizations, and nations (An
& Gower, 2009; Neuman et al., 1992). Economic frames are considered
important because the consequences of the frames can affect the market
and the nation.
Human interest frames emphasize psychological and emotional
angles in a crisis (Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000). Media are likely to
cover feelings of outrage, empathy, sympathy, or compassion to capture
and retain audience interest. Nabi (2002) discovered that different
versions of news stories on domestic terrorism—each of which was
designed to elicit anger and fear—induced different emotions from
study participants. H. J. Kim and Cameron (2011) experimented with
consumer responses to a cell phone battery explosion accident. In their
study, sadness-inducing news predicted a positive attitude toward the
corporation.
Morality frames look at a crisis in the context of religious or moral
prescriptions (Neuman et al., 1992). Media coverage includes moral
judgments such that a crisis is portrayed as preventable or unavoidable
indirectly through quotations or inference. The morality frame concerns
news coverage of any ethical action the entity takes to resolve the crisis.
Responsibility attribution frames suggest that news attributes responsibility for a crisis to either individual (episodic) or society (thematic; Iyengar, 1991). According to attribution theory (B. Weiner, 1993),
people attribute causes of issues to behaviors. Responsibility attribution
depends on the nature of a problem. Individual responsibility pertains
to an emphasis on the cause of a problem (e.g., personal), whereas social
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responsibility focuses on the people who have the power to control the
problem (e.g., a government, a corporation; Kang, 2013).
Issue-Specific Frames

Issue-specific frames investigate events in customized specificity because
each event consists of a different list of issues. Anchoring ideas frame an
event and become socially represented. In this process, some issues are
neglected, and some are emphasized (Flick, 1998). Issue-specific frames
can be explained as anchoring. Anchoring is the process of reducing
and transforming unfamiliar ideas into categories and images (Schmitz,
Filippone, & Edelman, 2003). Through the anchoring process, certain
issues are woven into the acceptable knowledge of audiences. Therefore
knowing issues in one’s own views can determine the way in which the
audience perceives and understands issues.
Crisis topics such as U.S. national budget deficits (Jasperson, Shah,
Watts, Faber, & Fan, 1998), international airline accidents (Entman,
1991), or the Gulf War (Reese & Buckalew, 1995) contain unique issues.
In their study on the news media coverage of Alitalia’s crisis, Valentini
and Romenti (2011) found that the domestic press’s top four issues were
the financial situation, investor relations, government management,
and employee relations. The international press’s top four issues were
investor relations, the financial situation, government management,
and labor union relations (Valentini & Romenti, 2011). Hong (2013)
discovered that the news media covered issues of product quality,
customer concern, and a systemic breakdown in the corporate crisis
of recalled Chinese products. When a crisis is involved with a product
or a service of a corporation, news issues cover a variety of issues, including the recall, side effects, scientific research evidence, complaints,
lawsuits, the investigation, prevention, the crisis cause, and potential
crisis solutions (D. Weiner, 2006).
Cross-National Frames

Characteristics of media organizations can affect media frames (Shoemaker & Reese, 1996). Some media organizations are conservative
or liberal (Cooper, 2002; Entman, 2010; Snow & Benford, 1992). The
political ideology of media organizations can affect framing (Scheufele,
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1999). In the process of framing, media organizations interpret social
issues differently depending on their political motivations or economic
needs (Simon & Xenos, 2000).
At the macrolevel, the frames of ethnocentrism, nationalism, and
professionalism influence the objectivity of coverage (Gans, 1979; Garyantes & Murphy, 2010). The national frame refers mainly to the domestication and localization of news stories for national interest (Nossek,
2004). For example, economic issues are more heavily influenced
by national interests because monetary profits are directly involved
(Graber, 1993; Neuman et al., 1992). Cultural differences, ideologies,
nationalism, norms, values, routines, physical distance, and business
interest can influence media coverage (Garyantes & Murphy, 2010;
Shoemaker & Reese 1996). Media organizations may apply the national
frame to economic or corporate crises (Shoemaker & Reese, 1996). The
national frame and national interest frame served as a driving force
of crisis coverage in Asia and Europe (Mao, 2014), which became a
reconstructing factor of reality in general.
Meanwhile, the professional frame accounts for a fact-based news
report rather than news framed with a slant (Nossek, 2004). When
journalists (both professionals and citizens) report international crisis
news, they tend to frame it as either “ours” or “theirs.” After that, the
professional frame (theirs) becomes subordinate to the national frame
(our crisis; Nossek, 2004).
Studies have found evidence of cultural filtering in foreign event
coverage, indicating that media organizations apply the “our” (national) frame rather than the “their” (professional) frame to the news
for the benefit of their nations (Stevenson & Cole, 1984; Wu, 2000). For
instance, with the national frame, the U.S. media attributed responsibility for the 2013 Asiana Airlines crash to the pilots and problematic
management of the flight. South Korean and Chinese media were less
negative toward the corporation than were U.S. news media (Yan &
Kim, 2015). In another airplane crisis, Entman (1991) found vastly different media frames based on national interest in covering international
airline tragedies. The U.S. downing of an Iranian plane was framed as a
technical accident, while the Soviet downing of a South Korean airline
plane was depicted as a moral outrage.
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Sentiment Research on Social Media

A crisis issue is shared or tweeted on social media through information interactions. Such user-driven news creation/sharing activities
constitute (a) social media agenda setting at the first level (i.e., the news
media set an agenda on social media) and at the second level (i.e., attributes of the issue become salient or insignificant on social media),
(b) user comments and decisions on the issue (Schultz, Utz, & Göritz,
2011). In this process of information interaction, users gain the power
to collaboratively build crisis frames on social media (van der Meer &
Verhoeven, 2013), and the media tone set on social media news posts
about crisis issues might affect the public’s sentiment toward the issues
(J. Kim et al., 2016).
Sentiment analysis has been used widely in social media research
because it can measure feelings toward communication in an interface.
Sentiment on social media is defined as the attitudinal valence of users’
mentions (Homburg, Ehm, & Artz, 2015). In other words, social media
posts about a crisis in terms of sentiment can be viewed as negative,
positive, or neutral (Choi & Lin, 2009). Users express negative emotions
with anger or fear. The neutral response can be fact sharing. Positive
emotions can include relief and sympathy. In dealing with crisis issues,
people tend to seek more social cues to check the climate of majority opinions on issues because they want to be harmonious with the
socially desirable and normative expectations of others (J. Kim et al.,
2016). Past research shows that people are likely to pay attention to crisis communication via social media more than they do via traditional
media because social media provide not only real-time information but
also social cues, such as user comments (Brummette & Fussell, 2015;
Utz, Schultz, & Glocka, 2013). Hence the sentiment analysis of crisis
communication on social media could provide a social cue for gauging
public attitudes on the issue (J. Kim et al., 2016).
Drawn from the review of framing in corporate crises and social
media, this study posits that social media posts about the Samsung
Galaxy Note 7 explosion consist of crisis frames and sentiment. Research
questions reflecting the inquiries are as follows:
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RQ1: How are generic frames (RQ1a), issue-specific frames (RQ1b),
and cross-national frames (RQ1c) about the Samsung crisis used in
social media posts?
RQ2: How is sentiment about the Samsung crisis posts used on social
media?
RQ3: How do generic frames (RQ3a), issue-specific frames (RQ3b),
and cross-national frames (RQ3c) for the Samsung crisis relate to
sentiment?

Method
Sampling Procedure

This study used the search keyword “Samsung Galaxy Note 7” for the
United States, Australia, and South Korea on Twitter. From the three
nations, the search between August 1, 2016, and January 31, 2017, yielded
549,424 tweets from the United States, 24,628 tweets from Australia,
and 5,036 tweets from South Korea, totaling 579,088 tweets. We used
Synthesio as the data collection platform.
The coding period was set for two reasons. First, the Galaxy Note 7
model was released to the public on August 2, 2016. The first explosion
was reported on August 19, 2016, in South Korea. Second, after a series
of explosions, recalls, bans on carrying the Galaxy Note 7 on flights,
and suspended production of the phone, Samsung officially announced
the cause of the explosion on January 22, 2017. This study analyzed the
tweets during the entire timeline of the explosion.
Twitter is used as a social media platform in analysis for several
reasons. Twitter provides a ready source of data for researchers interested in public opinion. Twitter, with its 140-character posts,1 consists
of news, tables, statistics, and charts (Driscoll & Walker, 2014). For both
professional and citizen journalists, Twitter is a supportive resource for
reporting, delivering, and sharing information. Twitter is used as an
information source for crises more than other social media platforms
because it is fast and up to date. On Twitter, users post “trending topics” with hashtags and links. For this reason, researchers and journalists rely on Twitter for interpreting and giving context to news events
(Valenzuela, Puente, & Flores, 2017). In addition to the general merits
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of Twitter mentioned earlier, another reason for using Twitter is that it
enables an equal comparison of the three nations. In this sense, Twitter is a more appropriate content source for the analysis of the three
nations than other popular platforms, such as Naver (the largest web
portal in South Korea), Facebook, and YouTube.
Three individuals participated in the data coding procedures and
took charge of each nation (United States, Australia, and South Korea).
Using a systematic data collection approach, the coders chose the first
tweet of each day in each month. The selection yielded 184 tweets (30
for September and November; 31 for August, October, December, and
January). Then, by selecting the three months with the most tweets,
the remaining 16 posts were chosen (N = 200). They were six from
the top 2 months (n = 12) and four from the third month (n = 4). Following the coding rules, a total of 600 tweets (200 from each nation)
were drawn for analysis. While most Twitter studies use large samples,
several framing studies have analyzed a sample size similar to the current study’s. Framing studies on Twitter use relatively small samples out
of many posts because aspects and valence are represented better by
manual coding than with big data (e.g., García-Perdomo, 2017; Manor
& Crilley, 2018; Pond & Lewis, 2019).
Coding Instrument

The unit of analysis is a Twitter post. The first coding scheme consisted
of generic and issue-specific frames (An & Gower, 2009; Flick, 1998).
Five generic frames were applied to the Samsung Galaxy Note 7 explosion case: conflict, economic consequences, human impact, morality,
and attribution (presence = 1, absence = 0; Table 1). Since the Samsung
case is concerned with a product, framing items from previous research about news media coverage of products were used (Hong, 2013;
Valentini & Romenti, 2011). The adjusted items in the Samsung Note
7 explosion context are product quality, customer concern, corporate
breakdown, recall, side effect, evidence, employee, lawsuit, business
expert, investigation, prevention, government, cause, solution, safety,
and design (presence = 1, absence = 0; Table 1). There were no additional
frame items to create in the coding process, which met the conceptual
saturation of frames.

a

Evidence of explosion
Samsung employees mentioning the explosion
Explosion-related lawsuit
Interviews with experts in the mobile phone industry
Investigations of explosion
How to prevent explosion
Government’s policy decision on Galaxy Note 7
Causes of explosion
Solutions offered for explosion victims
Banning Galaxy Note 7 for airplane boarding
Fire caught on Galaxy Note 7
Mentions of design regarding Galaxy Note 7 explosion

Employee (1.0, 1.0, 1.0)

Lawsuit (1.0, 1.0, 1.0)

Business expert (1.0, 1.0, 1.0)

Investigation (1.0, 1.0, 1.0)

Prevention (.77, 1.0, 1.0)

Government (1.0, 1.0, 1.0)

Cause (1.0, 1.0, .77)

Solution (.69, .64, .69)

Safety (1.0, 1.0, 1.0)

Fire (.61, 1.0, .69)

Design (1.0, 1.0, 1.0)

Positive, neutral, or negative toward Samsung and the explosion incidents

Values in parentheses indicate Cohen’s kappas for each country (United States, Australia, Korea, respectively).

Valence (.66, .73, .68)

Injury or negative brand image due to explosion

Evidence (1.0, 1.0, .83)

Sentiment

Recall of Galaxy Note 7

Side effects (.77, .69, .86)

On the side of the nation
Objective report

Samsung’s crisis

Recall (.77, .69, .78)

National
Professional (.76, 1.0, .65)

Expression of concerns about ownership of Galaxy Note 7

Who is responsible for the explosion, Samsung or consumers?

Attribution (.69, .64, .69)

Corporate breakdown (.67, 1.0, .74)

Samsung’s ethical action taken for explosion

Morality (.86, 1.0, .74)
Quality of Galaxy Note 7 regarding the explosion

Personal or emotional episodes regarding Galaxy Note 7 explosion

Human impact (1.0, 1.0, 1.0)

Customer concern (.62, .77, 1.0)

Economic impacts of the explosion; overall impacts of Galaxy Note 7 on the market

Economic consequence (1.0, 1.0, .62)

Product quality (.70, 1.0, .77)

Conflicting issues between individuals or groups (e.g., conflicts between Samsung and Apple, Galaxy
Note 7 advocates and critics)

Operational definition: Social media posts that frame . . .

Conflict (.61, 1.0, 1.0)

Cross-national

Specific

Generic

Issue a

Measured Frame Categories and Definitions for Samsung Galaxy Note 7 Explosion

Frame type

TABLE 1
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The coders also judged whether the posts contained aspects of the
national frame (on the side of the nation; coded as 2), the professional
frame (objective report; coded as 1), or not identified (coded as 0;
Nossek, 2004; Table 1). Regarding sentiment, the coding categories
were positive (2), neutral (1), and negative (0). When a post contained
a relieving, sympathetic, or favorable comment, it was coded as positive (e.g., “Samsung Galaxy Note 7’s iris scanner might be the coolest
smartphone feature ever”). Posts containing fact sharing were coded as
neutral (e.g., “Here are some pics of Samsung Galaxy Note 7”). When a
user expressed a negative emotion with anger or fear in the post, it was
coded as negative (e.g., “Samsung Galaxy Note 7 disappoints; iPhone
7 wins before launch?”). The validity of the coding was cross-checked
in intercoder reliability tests.
Intercoder Reliability

Three coders participated in intercoder reliability tests. The coder of the
U.S. sample drew 10% of the Australian data. The coder of the Australian
sample drew 10% of the South Korean data. The coder of the South
Korean sample drew 10% of the U.S. data. All three coders conducted
Cohen’s kappa for intercoder agreement of categorical data. Therefore
the three-nation data were cross-checked to ensure that coding reached
a mutual consensus. A few variable discrepancies were present on the
first attempt. After discussion, the reliability tests yielded acceptable
kappas (see Table 1 for individual kappa values). Overall, the average of
the three-nation reliability tests was acceptable, with a Cohen’s kappa
value of .83 (Landis & Koch, 1977).
Findings

Frequency analyses and Cramer’s V correlations for categorical data
were conducted for the posed research questions. RQ1a asked about the
distribution of generic frames in posts about the Samsung crisis (Table
2). Table 2 demonstrates that tweets about the crisis most frequently
included attribution (n = 131), followed by morality (n = 106), conflict
(n = 61), and economic consequence (n = 60). Generic frames were
posted in October 2016 (n = 95) the most, followed by September (n =
85) and November (n = 78).

4 (3.1)

Attribution
85

34 (26.0)

21 (19.8)

4 (30.8)

11 (18.3)

15 (24.6)

Sep.

95

33 (25.2)

27 (25.5)

4 (30.8)

21 (35.0)

13 (21.3)

Oct.

78

31 (23.7)

26 (24.5)

1 (7.7)

12 (20.0)

8 (13.1)

Nov.

Month, no. (%)

41

13 (9.9)

12 (11.3)

1 (7.7)

7 (11.7)

8 (13.1)

Dec.

53

16 (12.2)

16 (15.1)

1 (7.7)

4 (6.7)

6 (9.8)

Jan.

371

131***

106***

13

60**

61

Total

*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

Note. The total numbers of each row and column do not match 600 because the frequencies display presence only. The frequencies of presence were summed
up in total. The frequencies of absence were not included in the table, for readability.

26

4 (3.8)

Morality

Total

2 (15.4)

Human impact

11 (18.0)

Aug.

5 (8.3)

Frame

Generic Frames by Month

Economic consequence

Conflict

TABLE 2

0 (0.0)

0 (0.0)

3 (4.4)

2 (2.3)

0 (0.0)

8 (5.9)

Prevention

Government

Cause

Solution

Safety

Fire

424

3 (7.7)

37 (27.2)

21 (30.4)

27 (31.4)

18 (26.5)

13 (56.5)

19 (34.5)

10 (21.3)

3 (21.4)

1 (6.7)

3 (17.6)

24 (33.8)

32 (31.1)

44 (37.6)

114 (28.1)

28 (30.4)

27 (17.5)

Sep.

355

1 (2.6)

33 (24.3)

17 (24.6)

12 (14.0)

13 (19.1)

7 (30.4)

5 (9.1)

8 (17.0)

3 (21.4)

11 (73.3)

3 (17.6)

23 (32.4)

36 (35.0)

25 (21.4)

103 (25.4)

28 (30.4)

27 (17.5)

Oct.

228

4 (10.3)

14 (10.3)

12 (17.4)

20 (23.3)

5 (7.4)

1 (4.3)

12 (21.8)

8 (17.0)

3 (21.4)

2 (13.3)

6 (35.3)

8 (11.3)

12 (11.7)

18 (15.4)

73 (18.0)

13 (14.1)

17 (11.0)

Nov.

Month, no. (%)
Dec.

203

12 (30.8)

23 (16.9)

12 (17.4)

14 (16.3)

17 (25.0)

0 (0.0)

7 (12.7)

6 (12.8)

0 (0.0)

1 (6.7)

1 (5.9)

7 (9.9)

17 (16.5)

10 (8.5)

52 (12.8)

10 (10.9)

14 (9.1)

Jan.

193

3 (7.7)

21 (15.4)

7 (10.1)

11 (12.8)

12 (17.6)

2 (8.7)

12 (19.4)

13 (27.7)

3 (21.4)

0 (0.0)

4 (23.5)

2 (2.8)

5 (4.9)

20 (17.1)

52 (12.8)

4 (4.3)

22 (14.3)

Total

1,512

39***

136***

69**

86***

68***

23***

55**

47**

14

15***

17*

71***

103***

117***

406***

92**

154**

*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

Note. The total numbers of each row and column do not match 600 because the frequencies display presence only. The frequencies of presence were summed up in
total. The frequencies of absence were not included in the table, for readability.
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2 (4.3)

Investigation

Total

2 (14.3)

Business expert

16 (41.0)

0 (0.0)

Lawsuit

Design

7 (9.9)

1 (1.0)

Side effects

0 (0.0)

0 (0.0)

Recall

Employee

12 (3.0)

Corporate
breakdown

Evidence

9 (9.8)

47 (30.5)

Customer
concern

Product quality

Aug.

Issue-Specific Frames by Month

Frame

TABLE 3
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700
600
500
400
300
200
100
0

August

September
Negative

October
Neutral

November

December

Positive

January

Total

Total

Distribution of sentiment by month. The sentiment by month is significantly
different, χ2 (10, N = 600) = 144.18, p < .001.

FIGURE 1

RQ1b questioned how issue-specific frames were posted on Twitter
during the incident period (August 2016–January 2017; Table 3). The
result showed that tweets were highly focused on corporate breakdown
(Samsung’s crisis due to explosions; n = 406). The product quality issue
was the second most tweeted topic during the incident period (n = 154),
followed by fire (n = 136), recall (n = 117), and side effects (n = 103). The
least tweeted issue was business expert sources (n = 14).
RQ1c asked about the distribution of cross-national frames (national
or professional). Analysis revealed that there were more posts about the
professional frame (n = 104) than the national frame (n = 4), though
frame frequency by month was not statistically significant, χ2 (10, N =
600 = 14.91, ns. RQ2 asked about sentiment in the posts. Analysis discovered that the least frequently observed sentiment was positive posts
(n = 112; Figure 1). There were more posts with neutral sentiment (n =
258) than negative (n = 230) or positive sentiment (n = 112).
When comparing the relationship between generic frames and
sentiment, as asked in RQ3a, morality and sentiment were significantly
correlated with each other, V = .27, p < .001, indicating that Twitter users
viewed posts framing the incident in terms of morality more negatively
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TABLE 4

Cramer’s V Correlations Between Generic Frames and Sentiment
Sentiment, no. (%)

Frame

Negative

Neutral

Positive

Total

V

Conflict

26 (42.6)

23 (37.7)

12 (19.7)

61

0.04

Economic
consequence

26 (43.3)

22 (36.7)

12 (20.0)

60

0.04

Human
impact

6 (46.2)

3 (23.1)

4 (30.8)

13

0.06

Morality

70 (66.0)

28 (26.4)

8 (7.5)

106

0.27***

Attribution

80 (61.1)

43 (32.8)

8 (7.1)

131

0.26***

208

119

44

371

Total

Note. N = 371. The total numbers of each row and column do not match 600 because the frequencies display presence only. The frequencies of presence were summed up in total. The frequencies
of absence were not included in the table, for readability.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

than positively. The same finding was also observed between attribution
and sentiment, V = .26, p < .001 (Table 4).
RQ3b looked at the relationship between issue-specific frames and
sentiment. Most issue-specific frames were correlated with negative
sentiment (Table 5). Corporate breakdown was highly associated with
negative sentiment, V = .45, p < .001. Customer concerns, side effects,
fires on the phone, safety, and explosion evidence were significantly
associated with negative sentiment. However, the significant association between product quality and sentiment demonstrated that several supporters of Samsung posted the quality of Galaxy Note 7 more
positively than neutrally, V = .21, p < .001. Regarding design, there
was more positive sentiment than negative, V = .19, p < .001. RQ3c
questioned how cross-national frames were related to sentiment. As
shown in Table 6, there was no significant relationship between them.
No discrepancies were found between negative and positive sentiment
by cross-national frames.

77 (56.6)
4 (10.3)
804

Fire

Design

Total

559

18 (46.2)

56 (46.2)

26 (37.7)

36 (41.9)

33 (48.5)

13 (56.5)

5 (35.7)

4 (26.7)

3 (17.6)

149

17 (43.6)

3 (2.2)

0 (0.0)

14 (16.4)

4 (5.9)

0 (0.0)

4 (7.3)

3 (6.4)

4 (28.6)

1 (6.7)

7 (41.2)

3 (4.2)

5 (4.9)

10 (8.5)

30 (7.4)

0 (0.0)

44 (28.6)

Positive

1,512

39

136

69

86

68

23

55

47

14

15

17

71

103

117

406

92

154

Total

0.19***

0.29***

0.21***

0.03

0.12*

0.09

0.10*

0.09

0.04

0.09

0.11*

0.26***

0.42***

0.13**

0.45***

0.43***

0.21***

V

*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

Note. N = 1,512. The total numbers of each row and column do not match 600 because the frequencies display presence only. The frequencies of presence
were summed up in total. The frequencies of absence were not included in the table, for readability.

36 (41.9)
43 (62.3)

Solution

Safety

31 (45.6)

Cause

24 (43.6)

27 (49.1)

18 (38.3)

Investigation
10 (43.5)

5 (35.7)

Business expert

Prevention

10 (66.7)

Lawsuit

Government

26 (55.3)

7 (41.2)

Employee

12 (11.7)
17 (23.9)

86 (83.5)
51 (71.8)

Side effects

55 (47.0)

Evidence

52 (44.4)

Recall

177 (43.6)

12 (13.0)

80 (87.0)
199 (49.0)

Customer concern

42 (27.3)

Neutral

Sentiment, no. (%)
68 (44.2)

Negative

Corporate breakdown

Frame

Cramer’s V Correlations Between Issue-Specific Frames and Sentiment

Product quality

TABLE 5
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TABLE 6

Cramer’s V Correlations Between Cross-National Frames and Sentiment
Sentiment

Frame

Negative

Neutral

Positive

Total

Not identified

195 (39.6)

210 (42.7)

87 (17.7)

492

Professional

33 (31.7)

46 (44.2)

25 (24.0)

104

National

2 (50.0)

2 (50.0)

0 (0.0)

4

230

258

112

600

Total

V (N)

0.06 (600)a

Note. Values in parentheses indicate percentages for each cross-national frame.
The total number matches 600 because the frame items include all responses (professional,
national, and not identified).
a

Discussion

This analysis of Samsung crisis posts demonstrates that social media
are a sphere of disseminating news, opinions, and sentiment. Posts on
social media may affect both the corporation and the public in terms
of reputation management, PR strategies, and behavioral intentions.
This study investigated framing types and expressed sentiment in
Twitter posts about the Samsung crisis and associated sentiment with
particular framing types. These research questions are of importance
for both academics and practitioners for several reasons. Nowadays,
global organizations are crisis prone due to the snowballing and unlimited nature of global media platforms such as Twitter. Also, as digital
media have evolved, so has the audience. As opposed to customers
at brick-and-mortar stores—the vast majority of which are valued
customers—users of social media tend to respond quickly and often
without mercy when a corporation faces a crisis, thereby exacerbating
the issue via sharing behaviors. This study paid special attention to
Twitter as one of the most influential social media platforms, especially
when conveying breaking stories to the masses (Murthy, 2011).
The findings of this study demonstrate where sentiment lies during or after a crisis. The first set of research questions (RQ1) concerned
how an international corporate crisis was framed on social media. In
RQ1a on generic frames, findings demonstrated that attribution and
morality frames were more frequently posted than conflict, economic
consequence, and human impact frames. For instance, a South Korean
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user mentioned Samsung’s responsibility for the explosion on Twitter,
writing, “OMG, should Samsung pay for the damage to the vehicle due
to the phone explosion?” However, there were relatively few ethical
actions or responsibility posts from Samsung. The most frequently
used frame (attribution) this study found is congruent with previous
research on news framing in traditional media (Semetko & Valkenburg,
2000), indicating a consistency of framing regardless of the news dissemination platform.
As the findings of RQ1b illustrate, posts expressing negative sentiment (e.g., corporate breakdown, product quality, fire, and recall) were
more frequently tweeted than posts expressing positive sentiment (e.g.,
solution, prevention, and safety). The pattern of issue coverage between
legacy news media (Hong, 2013) and Twitter was similar in issue-specific
framing. Findings suggest that Twitter users perform secondary crisis
communication (SCC), which is defined as conveying news and others’
posts about the crisis (Zheng, Liu, & Davison, 2018). Social media users’
cognitive reputation in Samsung resulted in SCC, as they felt morally violated through the explosion incident. During and after the crisis, many
posts highlighted the corporate breakdown of Samsung. For instance, a
U.S. user’s retweet reads, “There’s a worldwide recall on the new Samsung Note 7’s. It’s been reported they’re catching fire. Return it ASAP.”
The analysis for RQ1c found that there were more professional
frames than national frames (see the appendix for sample tweets of
cross-national frames). This result shows a slightly different pattern
than the past research on crisis news coverage, which was national
frame oriented (Mao, 2014; Shoemaker & Reese, 1996). We found
more cosmopolitanism (no significant difference among the nations)
than in the national frame. It should be noted that traditionally and
conventionally framing theory itself has been utilized to identify and
analyze “how journalists depict a crisis.” Yet this study applies framing
theory differently than the previous approach, as we look at how global
online users respond to a crisis rather than investigate press coverage.
To be specific, in previous research (Mao, 2014), the Chinese press
constructed two crises (the Asian financial crisis and the European
debt crisis) with many levels of the national frame. The difference in
findings between the current and previous studies might be due to the
different natures of newspapers and Twitter.
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While we found the value of framing as theoretical and methodological tool for examining online audiences’ collective selection of
information and sharing behaviors, we also found that cosmopolitanism on the global media might prevail over the national frame. Twitter
is a global medium, unlike traditional media platforms, such as local
newspapers or national broadcasting, so the national frame might have
disappeared or been watered down in comparison to a traditional form
of media coverage. In an online sphere, global audiences and issue-based
communities are formed and activated. Therefore the result might have
been different than previous findings due to the different nature and
scope of digital media platforms compared to traditional ones.
The second aim of the current study was to explore the distribution
of sentiment in Twitter posts on the Samsung crisis (RQ2). Given the
finding of more negative sentiment than positive sentiment, Twitter
users may hold the power to collaborate in crisis frame building (van
der Meer & Verhoeven, 2013). Twitter users’ power is an interactive
process in which some posts on a topic can capture other users’ attention. Once the posts capture attention, they are retweeted. For example,
a U.S. user retweeted the hyperlinked news with negative sentiment:
“Samsung Galaxy Note 7 Disappoints; iPhone 7 Wins Before Launch?
http://dlvr.it/M7mm9x #newiphone.”
A significant relationship was found between social media post
frames and audience sentiment (RQ3). When correlations between
generic frames and sentiment were tested in Cramer’s V analyses,
attribution and morality were correlated with negative sentiment.
Therefore this study suggests that prompt and constant responses to a
crisis posted on the corporation’s social media pages can be used for
shares and retweets. In this way, morality and attribution frames may
be framed positively.
This interpretation of generic frames and sentiment applies to the
comparison between issue-specific frames and sentiment. Corporate
breakdown, customer concerns, and side effects were the top three
issues highly associated with negative sentiment. This comparison suggests that companies should manage social media posts to respond to
a crisis strategically. Active posts, such as apologies, ideas to overcome
corporate breakdowns, management of side effects, and the provision
of solutions, can be some response options.
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Overall, most of the negative posts are centered around the “issuespecific frame” with regard to product failure, not the national frame
of the issue. Given these results, crisis communicators should note that
the rebuild strategy is a recommendable action to turn around negative
sentiment with crisis relief (Coombs, 2007). Also, this study’s results
shed light on the importance and role of Twitter in cross-national crisis
situations, as negative sentiment mushroomed with information sharing
among global user communities. Samsung and influencers supporting
the corporation would have used Twitter to rebuild Samsung’s reputation proactively. However, not enough suitable and effective responses
and/or thoughtful communication messages from Samsung were found
in response to product failure and corporate breakdown. Thus Samsung seemed to fail to win immediate attention from customers in
terms of handling the issue. This might be the case for other global IT
corporations. IT corporations might not have feasible communication
solutions or communication strategies against any potential and/or
impending crises.
Audiences used Twitter for the news and information dissemination
of the explosion in the form of retweets and comments. The current
study found that users externalized breaking news on the explosion by
hyperlinking. Hyperlinking invoked public discussion on the incident.
Users participated in retweeting and commenting behaviors with personal sentiment. Past research demonstrated that social media users
interpret news frames and create their own discussion forums on Twitter
(Valenzuela, Piña, & Ramírez, 2017; Wasike, 2013). Therefore Twitter
users create a new sphere of discussion by sharing frames (generic,
issue specific) with other users actively.
Theoretical and Practical Implications

This study analyzed social media posts about a corporate crisis regarding generic, issue-specific, cross-national frames and regarding
sentiment. This approach opens the possibility of combining framing
and other crisis communication theories. The framing perspective
can be incorporated into situational crisis communication theory in
the social media context. The issues posted on social media can be
elaborated on generic and issue-specific frames. Different crisis types
(victim, accidental, and intentional) can be observed in those issues
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on social media. Eventually, some posts can predict audiences’ positive
or negative attitudes toward the corporation (Kim & Cameron, 2011).
The dominant negative posts on social media suggest that the platform can be an influential channel for the global audience. In response
to the crisis, findings reveal that social media users are highly concerned
about corporate morality and attribution. Therefore corporations can
pay attention to ethical and responsibility aspects in their social media
posts. Given the positive relationship between issue-specific frames and
negative sentiment, corporations may continually monitor social media
posts and post emotional stories in an effort to elicit positive audience
perceptions (Spence, Sellnow-Richmond, Sellnow, & Lachlan, 2016).
Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research

This study contains several methodological limitations. The sample (N =
600) out of more than 100,000 Twitter posts does not fully reflect the
Samsung Note 7 explosion. Although framing research uses a relatively
small sample for manual coding, sample representativeness is a study
limitation. Future research on big data can represent a valid state of
the explosion incident. Intermedia agenda setting research can warrant
the flow of social media posts on this topic. An expanded analysis of
social media and traditional news media can show the power of media
channels covering the issue and public perceptions. Therefore surveying the public about attitudes toward a corporation can provide further
answers. The survey questions for the public could be drawn from a
content analysis of social media posts. Then the public could indicate
how often they view the messages and evaluate the experience. Future
research can compare social media posts with public attitudes.
In conclusion, the results of the present study imply that Twitter was
used more for negative posts than for positive ones on the Samsung
Galaxy Note 7 explosion case. Users paid attention to corporate morality,
attribution, corporate breakdown, product quality, and the recall. Even
though the national frame was not a significant frame, negative sentiment was prominent. The findings suggest that analyses of Twitter can
provide a content structure of the Samsung Galaxy Note 7 explosion.
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Appendix: Sample Tweets of Cross-National Frames

Professional frame: RT @verge: Breaking: Samsung will reportedly issue worldwide recall of Galaxy Note 7 http://www.theverge
.com/2016/9/1/12759912/samsung-galaxy-note-7-recall?utm_campaign
=theverge&utm_content=chorus&utm_medium=social&utm_source
=twitter
National frame: RT @themoneygame: Korea’s won tumbles as BOK
warns of possible Samsung Galaxy Note 7 fallout https://t.co/aEv7p
C6amc
Not identified: RT @techtimestv: Here are some pics of Samsung
Galaxy Note 7 @techtimestv
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Note
1. Twitter started a 280-character tweet limit on November 7, 2017.
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In this essay, we reflect on the comments reviewers have provided to
authors over the past year. In doing so, we aim to arm authors with the
knowledge required to submit strong manuscripts. A secondary aim is
to encourage reviewers to continue providing supportive and helpful
feedback. Our goal is to detect patterns in reviewers’ comments as well
as important outliers. To accomplish this goal, we used the qualitative
analysis program NVivo to jointly code the anonymous reviews.1 In this
essay, we present our key findings from multiple rounds of coding. All
reviewers’ comments from the past year were downloaded from the
online submission system, any identifying information was removed,
and comments were uploaded into the NVivo qualitative analysis
software. We split the comments into two sections and engaged in firstround coding, identifying whether comments referred to the following
sections: literature review, methods, results, discussion, and general
writing issues. We then engaged in axial coding, further subcategorizing the codes in each section to better describe the properties of each
initial section (Saldaña, 2015). We organize this essay by summarizing
reviewers’ comments on the common sections of manuscripts and
crosscutting feedback.
Summary of Reviewer Comments
Literature Review

Reviewers frequently note that authors have insufficient and/or underdeveloped literature to ground their research. To improve literature
reviews, recommendations include writing a comprehensive review,
not just a review of sampled studies; including key studies, even if they
are older “classics”; incorporating the most recent research; and clearly
connecting each section of the literature review. Additionally, literature
reviews should accurately summarize prior research and justify why
some concepts and theories are included and others are not. For empirical research, reviewers note that literature reviews must justify the need
for proposed research questions and hypotheses. For all manuscripts,
reviewers ask for streamlined literature reviews to allow space for the
other important parts of manuscripts. In short, reviewers are deep
experts in crisis and risk communication and expect manuscripts to
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reflect topic-matter expertise. When literature reviews were thorough,
well argued, and logically organized, reviewers complimented authors
for these noted strengths.
In terms of theories covered in literature reviews, some reviewers
critique authors for selecting outdated or mismatched theories. Reviewers often comment on theory, including asking for the addition
of well-developed theoretical frameworks when manuscripts do not
include theory. When proposing new models or theories, reviewers
request adequate justification for why new models or theories are
needed.
Methods

The journal is open to any method, and thus reviewer comments were
fairly diverse, because they were closely connected to the specific methods used. These methods include case studies, interviews, big data
analysis, content analysis, systematic literature reviews, surveys, and
experiments. Despite the variety of methods, generally, comments on
methods can be categorized into three major concerns: sampling and
study design, operationalization of variables, and analysis. Across all
of these areas, reviewers show a clear preference for detailed methods
sections.
Sampling and study design. Across methods, reviewers ask authors to justify their samples. For example, in case studies, authors
should explain why they selected certain cases and not others. Reviewers sometimes criticize authors for selecting cases that are out of
date. MechanicalTurk (Mturk) is a popular data collection site, but
information about recruiting via Mturk, and indeed recruiting for all
samples, is needed. For example, reviewers asked, What was the call for
participants? What incentives were participants offered? How was data
cleaning undertaken? and What was the completion rate? Furthermore,
reviewers request that authors explicitly state the limitations of their
sampling strategies. In terms of study design, reviewers request clear,
step-by-step explanations for all research designs. Reviewers further ask
for appendices that include study manipulations in the case of experiments, interview protocols in the case of qualitative research, search
terms and databases employed in the case of systematic reviews, and
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information about how social media posts were collected and in what
time frame in the case of social media analysis.
Operationalization. Reviewers sometimes express concern with
the operationalization of variables, especially when variables central to
analysis are measured with only one item or when multidimensional
concepts are measured with single items unlikely to capture the concept’s
different dimensions. Alternatively, some reviewers express concern
about low scale reliability. There was also concern that operationalizations of certain concepts did not match their conceptualizations and,
in fact, were not measuring what they were intended to measure (i.e.,
they lacked validity). In content analyses in particular, reviewers call
for clear explanation of how codes were applied, including providing
exemplars for each code to aid understanding. Reviewers further call
for explanation of how codebooks were developed. For experimental
and survey research, reviewers ask authors to clearly report at least one
exemplar question used to measure each central variable. Reviewers
also need specific information about what covariates were measured.
A final area of concern for some reviewers is when concepts central to
certain theories were not captured in measurements or analysis.
Analysis. Reviewer comments regarding analytic methods vary
widely, depending on the method used. Generally, reviewers ask authors to explain why the chosen analytic method was appropriate given
the available data and hypotheses/research questions. They also ask
for clear explanations for methods employed. A common request for
quantitative research is for authors to push their analyses further by
using more sophisticated analytic techniques. Some reviewers remind
authors of the importance of only reporting analyses that correspond
to written hypotheses or research questions.
Results

In general, there were fewer concerns specific to research results compared to other sections of submitted manuscripts. For quantitative studies, reviewers sometimes note a lack of precision and detail in reporting
results. For example, reviewers ask authors to clarify whether they were
reporting standardized or unstandardized coefficients. For qualitative
research, reviewers often call for more rich details and additional ex-
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amples to demonstrate themes. Overall, reviewers find the inclusion of
subheadings in results sections helpful. Subheadings may correspond
with research questions or hypotheses to signal to the reader alignment
between methods and results. Tables and figures are also useful and
concise ways to represent results. Finally, for all research, reviewers
recommend using precise language to convey findings accurately.
Discussion and Conclusions

For all methods, reviewers call on authors to move beyond a review of
their findings in the discussion section. Instead, authors should engage
past literature and provide practical and theoretical implications drawn
from their findings. Reviewers recommend tying conclusions back to
the extant research—including relevant research that may not have
been included in the literature review. When authors are interpreting
findings, reviewers ask authors to articulate the new contributions that
their research makes. Practical contributions should be specific and
actionable. Contributions to theory also should be specific. Reviewers note that misalignment between findings and implications drawn
is a common pitfall of discussion sections. Reviewers also frequently
recommend using tentative language, rather than definitive language,
in attempts to generalize findings to theory and practice.
Crosscutting Issues

Reviewers provided some comments on issues that pertain to multiple
parts of manuscripts, as summarized in the following paragraphs.
“So what” issues. One of the most challenging aspects of research
can be justifying the “so what” of a project. Unsurprisingly, reviewers
often comment on the “so what” issue. First, the introduction and literature review must clearly and persuasively justify the “so what.” Part
of this justification includes a deep understanding of the literature. In
terms of how to specifically justify the “so what” of a project, reviewers
recommend considering how the research contributes to society, theory
building, methodological advancement, and/or risk and crisis communication practice. Reviewers urge authors to make explicit reference
to how their research extends, clarifies, or corrects past research in the
discussion and conclusion section of manuscripts. In short, to address
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the “so what” issue, authors can answer questions such as, Why is this
study important? How can it improve practice? How can it develop
theory? and What gaps does it fill?
General writing issues. Reviewers frequently express concerns
about writing. These concerns can be categorized into four general
areas: grammar mistakes or spelling typos, lack of attention to American Psychological Association (APA) style, lack of flow, and verbosity. Grammar and/or spelling errors distract reviewers and, in some
cases, impede understanding of manuscripts. Reviewers often suggest
that authors conduct thorough proofreading of their work and pay
careful attention to APA style. While recognizing the international
scope of the journal and the importance of diverse voices in crisis and
risk communication scholarship, many reviewers recommend the use
of a copy editor, especially for authors who do not appear to be native English speakers. Furthermore, reviewers call for consistency in
terms throughout manuscripts and ask authors to avoid passive voice,
ensure subject–verb agreement, and employ appropriate word choice.
The editorial team is committed to continuing to work with authors
who are not native English speakers; yet, it is important to realize that
reviewers have persistent concerns with writing for many manuscripts
submitted to the journal.
Other writing issues are stylistic in nature. Reviewers note that
manuscripts are often too long, sometimes as a result of unfocused
literature reviews. Repetition in the author’s own writing also unnecessarily increases length, and reviewers ask authors to make their
manuscripts more succinct. Tips for improving the flow and length of
a manuscript include avoiding redundancy in the introduction and
literature review, adding subheaders, avoiding long paragraphs, and
organizing the manuscript according to APA guidelines. Thinking
of an article like an hourglass is a useful visualization: Start off broad
in the introduction and narrow in as the article presents hypotheses/
research questions, methods, and findings. Broaden out again in the
discussion and conclusion sections. In terms of flow, reviewers note
two common issues with introductions: an insufficient introduction
that jumps too quickly to the literature review or an introduction that
does not introduce the topic at hand or explain why it is important to

What Do Reviewers Want?

297

study. Reviewers recommend strong thesis or purpose statements at
the end of introductions to give readers a framework for the importance of the study. The target article length for the journal is 25 total
pages, including references (the abstract and cover page do not count
toward that limit).
Manuscript strengths. The majority of reviewers are constructive
and sometimes take time to note manuscripts’ strengths. Generally,
reviewers praise authors for focusing on interesting topics, such as
crisis events of great significance to many, topics that illustrate unique
deficiencies in crisis literature, and topics that provide fresh perspectives
on risk or crisis communication theory. Studies with novel data and/or
approaches also receive praise. As discussed, reviewers enjoy reading
manuscripts with strong introductions that persuasively articulate the
“so what,” employ clear and compelling writing, and have well-organized
literature reviews. Finally, manuscripts with sophisticated analyses that
lead to significant theoretical and/or applied advancements are highly
commended.
Conclusion

When we accepted the offer to edit this journal more than a year ago,
we were entering unknown territory: Would we receive sufficient quality research? Would reviewers provide consistently helpful feedback?
Would the journal fulfill its mission of providing the first home for
cutting-edge, open-access crisis and risk communication scholarship?
As is evident in the articles published over the past 2 years, we are well
on our way to fulfilling our mission, a mission that includes publishing
scholarship from emerging and well-established scholars from around
the globe. This essay further demonstrates that reviewers are indeed
providing quality feedback. By lifting the veil of secrecy behind the peer
review process, our intent in this essay is to help authors submit even
higher quality scholarship to the journal. Together we can continue
to build the premier peer-reviewed journal for crisis and risk communication scholarship.
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Note
1. The University of Maryland Institutional Review Board (IRB) was consulted to determine whether this essay constituted human subjects research,
thus necessitating informed consent. The IRB determined that this essay is
“not research.”
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